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Dykman: Rape Shield Statutes

NOTE
LAJOIEu THOMPSON: DOES THE
NINTH CIRCUIT GRANT YOUNG
VICTIMS LESS PROTECTION
UNDER RAPE SHIELD STATUTES?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Almost every state as well as the Federal Rules of Evidence has enacted rape shield laws that limit the admission
of evidence of an alleged victim's past sexual behavior.1 In
general, rape shield laws deny a defendant in a sexual assault
case the opportunity to offer extrinsic evidence of the com-"
plainant's prior sexual conduct or reputation and the opportunity to cross-examine the complainant concerning her prior
sexual conduct or reputation. 2 Rape shield statutes generally
do not violate a defendant's constitutional right to present evidence. a However, a rape shield statute may deny the defendant's Due Process,4 confrontation and compulsory process
See 29 AM. JUR. Evidence § 496 (2d ed. 1994). See also FEn. R. EVID. 412.
See 29 AM. JUR. Evidence § 496 (2d ed. 1994). See generally United States v.
Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1468 (9th Cir. 1991) (trial for child molestation, defendant not
allowed to introduce evidence of alleged victim's prior sexual encounter with another
person); Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544, 1545-1546 (9th Cir. 1992) (trial for rape,
defendant precluded from introducing evidence that alleged victim showed the
defendant her Penthouse photographs and that she spoke about her pornographic
acting experiences); Tague v. Richards, 3 F.3d 1133, 1137 (7th Cir. 1993) (trial for
child molestation, the trial court precluded evidence that the alleged victim had previously been molested by her father).
3 See 29 AM. JUR. Evidence § 496 (2d ed. 1994). The defendant's Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process rights and Sixth Amendment Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clause rights can be implicated by application of a rape shield statute
that may limit or exclude evidence of the complainant's sexual history or reputation.
See id.
• See supra note 3 and accompanying text. The Fourteenth Amendment provides
in pertinent part: "[nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
1

2

1
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rights. 5 In June 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the trial court violated
Clint LaJoie's Due Process, confrontation, and compulsory
process rights. 6
In LaJoie v. Thompson, 7 the Ninth Circuit held that the
trial court's preclusion of evidence regarding the victim's prior
sexual abuse by others as a sanction for LaJoie's failure to
comply with the 15-day notice requirement in Oregon's rape
shield law violated LaJoie's Sixth Amendment rights. 8 The
Ninth Circuit further held that the preclusion of this evidence
regarding the prior sexual abuse of the victim warranted
habeas relief 9
In Part II, this Note discusses LaJoie's facts and procedural history. Part III outlines the history of the Habeas Corpus
statutes and discusses the Oregon and Federal rape shield
statutes, with an emphasis on how these types of statutes afwithout due process of law ... " See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
6 See 29 AM. JUR. Evidence § 496 (2d ed. 1994). See also supra note 3 and accompanying text. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him [and) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor
... " See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6 See LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 667 (9th Cir. 2000). The appeal from
the United States District Court for the District of Oregon was argued and submitted
July 13, 1999 before Circuit Judge Fletcher, Circuit Judge Ferguson and Circuit
Judge Tashima. [d. at 663. The opinion was filed on January 31, 2000. [d. The opinion was subsequently withdrawn and an amended opinion filed on June 23, 2000. [d.
Circuit Judge Tashima authored the opinion. [d. at 665. Circuit Judge Ferguson authored a dissenting opinion. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 665.
7 See 217 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2000).
8 See id. at 673. See generally OR. REV. STAT. § 40.210(3)(a) (West 2000) (Rule
412, Oregon's "Rape Shield" Law). Oregon's Rule 412 provides in relevant part:
"(1) . .. reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged
victim of such crime is not admissible; (2) . . . evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence is also not admissible, unless such
evidence other than reputation or opinion evidence: (a) is admitted in accordance
with subsection (4) of this section; and (b) Is evidence that: (A) relates to the motive
or bias of the alleged victim; or (B) Is necessary to rebut or explain scientific or medical evidence offered by the state; or (C) Is otherwise constitutionally required to be
admitted." See OR. REV. STAT. § 40.210(1)-(2)(a)-(2)(b)(A)-(C). Under Rule 412, "past
sexual behavior" generally applies to child sexual abuse. See LaJoie: 217 F.3d at 666
(citing State v. Wright, 776 P.2d 1294, 1298 (1989)).
9 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the exclusion of
this relevant evidence seriously undermined LaJoie's defense. [d.
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fect a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation
and compulsory process and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. Part IV analyzes the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. in
LaJoie. Part V critiques the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in light
of the majority's determination that the probative value of the
excluded evidence substantially outweighed its potential prejudicial effect. Part VI concludes that the Ninth Circuit improperly held that excluding the evidence created a constitutional error because the prejudicial effect of the evidence
substantially outweighed its low probative value. Accordingly,
the Ninth Circuit improperly granted LaJoie's writ of habeas
corpus because the trial court did not commit constitutional
error to warrant habeas relief.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The state accused Clint LaJoie of sexually abusing, orally
sodomizing, and raping his girlfriend's niece, VN, a minor
child. 10 While VN lived with her aunt and LaJoie, LaJoie al10 See id. at 665. "VN" is used to protect the identity of the minor victim who
was seven and eight years old at the time of the alleged sexual assaults. See id. The
State charged LaJoie with rape in the first degree, OR. REV. STAT. § 163.375, sodomy
in the first degree, OR. REV. STAT. § 163.405, and sexual abuse in the first degree,
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.427, involving a child under the age of 12 years. See State v. LaJoie, 849 P.2d 479, 481 (1993). A person is guilty of rape in the first degree if:
"(a) the victim is subjected to forcible compulsion by the person; (b) the victim
is under 12 years of age; (c) the victim is under 16 years of age and is the person's sibling, of the whole or half blood, the person's child or the person's
spouse's child; or (d) the victim is incapable of consent by reason of mental defect, mental incapacitation or physical helplessness." (OR. REV. STAT. § 163.375
(West 2000)).
A person is guilty of sodomy in the first degree if he engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person or causes another person to engage in deviate sexual intercourse if:
"(a) the victim is subjected to forcible compulsion by the person; (b) the victim
is under 12 years of age; (c) the victim is under 16 years of age and is the person's sibling, of the whole or half blood, the person's child or the person's
spouse's child; or (d) the victim is incapable of consent by reason of mental defect, mental incapacitation or physical helplessness." (OR. REV. STAT. § 163.405
(West 2000».
A person is guilty of sexual abuse in the first degree if he:
"(a) subjects another person to sexual contact and: (A) the victim is less than
14 years of age; (B) the victim is subjected to forcible compulsion by the actor;
or (C) the victim is incapable of consent by reason of being mentally defective,
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legedly groped, fondled, and raped VN almost every night.ll
Undisputed evidence showed that VN suffered sexual abuse
by four different men prior to residing with her aunt and
LaJoie. 12
Following several continuances at the request of the
State, the court set LaJoie's trial for October 31, 1989. 13 On
October 24, 1989, LaJoie filed a notice of intent to offer evidence under Oregon Revised Statute Section 40.210 (Rule
412) that others sexually abused VN in the past.14 In addition, LaJoie filed a motion to compel the production of evidence in the Children Service's division (hereinafter "CSD")
case file pertaining to this abuse. 15
The State moved to strike the evidence on the basis that
LaJoie had failed to comply with Oregon Rule 412's 15-day
mentally incapacitated or physically helpless; or (b) intentionally causes a person under 18 years of age to touch or contact the mouth, anus or sex organs of
an animal for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of a person." (OR. REV. STAT. § 163.427 (West 2000».
11 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 674. LaJoie was the boyfriend of VN's aunt. See id.
VN's testimony showed that LaJoie came to VN almost every night, shook her awake,
took off her underwear, and groped, fondled, and raped her while her aunt slept. [d.
According to VN, LaJoie threatened to whip her with his leather belt if she told anyone. [d.
12 See id. at 665. The uncontested evidence in the Children Service's Division
(hereinafter, "CSD"), case file showed that VN had been sexually abused by four
other men and raped by one other man in unrelated incidents. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d
at 665. The specific incidents of abuse contained in the CSD case file were: (1)
Michael Patterson had raped VN's brother and that he may have assaulted VN when
she was two years old; (2) a boyfriend of VN's mother, Mike Forrest, may have sexually assaulted VN; (3) VN's great-uncle Daniel Leuck had admitted to fondling her
rectal and vaginal areas on several occasions; (4) Brian Dayton, a teenager, had pulled down her pants on one occasion; and (5) Russell Watkins, another of her mother's
boyfriends, had been convicted of raping and sexually abusing VN. [d. at 666. The
CSD is now called the State Commission on Children and Families. See OR. REV.
STAT. § 417.705 (West 2000). Oregon created the State Commission on Children and
Families to promote the wellness of children and families at the state level. See OR.
REV. STAT. § 417.735 (West 2000). The State Commission on Children and Families
(formerly the CSD) evaluates reports of child neglect and abuse. See Bryan J. Orrio,
Comment, Ending the Domestic Violence Cycle Through Victim Education in Oregon's
Restraining Order Process, 33 WILLAME'ITE L. REV. 971, 990 (1997).
13 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 665. The trial did not start as scheduled on October
31, 1989, but was continued until November 3, 1989. [d. at 672 n.12.
14 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
15 See supra note 12 and accompanying text; infra note 16 and accompanying
text.
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notice requirement. 16 The trial court conducted an in camera 17
review of the CSD file pursuant to Rule 412(4)(b) and concluded that the file did contain evidence potentially admissi~
ble under Rule 412(2)(b)(A) and (2)(b)(B).18 Nevertheless, the
court granted the State's motion to exclude the evidence because LaJoie failed to meet the fifteen-day notice requirement
under Rule 412(4)(a).19
16 See OR. REv. STAT. § 40.210(4)(a) (West 2000) (Rule 412(4)(a», which provides
that: "If the person accused of committing rape, sodomy or sexual abuse or attempted
rape, sodomy or sexual abuse intends to offer evidence under subsection (2) or (3) of
this section, the accused shall make a written motion to offer the evidence not later
than 15 days before the date on which the trial in which the evidence is to be offered
is scheduled to begin, except that the court may allow the motion to be made at a
later date, including during trial, if the court determines either that the evidence is
newly discovered and could not have been obtained earlier through the exercise of
due diligence or that the issue to which the evidence relates has newly arisen in the
case." See id. See also LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 666 n.3.
17 See OR. REv. STAT. § 40.210(4)(b) (West 2000) (Rule 412(4)(b». Section 40.210
provides in pertinent part that: "If the court determines that the offer of proof contains evidence described in subsection (2) or (3) of this section, the court shall order a
hearing in camera to determine if the evidence is admissible." [d. At the hearing the
parties may call witnesses, including the alleged victim, and offer relevant evidence.
[d. "In camera" means out of the presence of the public and the jury. See OR. REv.
STAT. § 40.210(5)(b) (Rule 412(5)(b». An in camera hearing serves two purposes: (1) it
gives the defendant the opportunity to demonstrate to the court why certain evidence
is admissible and ought to be presented to the jury; and (2) at the same time it protects the privacy of the victim in those instances where the court finds that evidence
is inadmissible. See State v. LaJoie, 312 Or. 286, 397-398 (1991).
18 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 666. The trial court concluded that the CSD file contained evidence ·potentially admissible under Rule 412(2)(b)(B) because it was relevant to rebut or explain medical evidence offered by the State. [d. The State offered
evidence that VN had scarring on her hymen consistent with penetration and repetitive sexual abuse. [d. at 666-667. The evidence in the CSD file that Russell Watkins,
one of VN's mother's boyfriends, had been convicted of raping VN was relevant to rebut or ~xplain the State's evidence of VN's injuries. [d. at 666. The court also found
that one piece of evidence from the CSD file was relevant to show the motive or the
bias of the alleged victim, VN, because it tended to show that VN's allegations were
false and were invited by CSD caseworkers, and thus was potentially admissible
under Rule 412(2)(b)(A). [d.
19 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 666. The specific evidence which LaJoie intended to offer was that: (1) Michael Patterson had raped VN's brother and that he may have assaulted VN when she was two years old; (2) a boyfriend of VN's mother, Mike Forrest, may have sexually assaulted VN; (3) VN's great-uncle Daniel Leuck had
admitted to fondling her rectal and vaginal areas on several occasions; (4) Brian Dayton, a teenager, had pulled down her pants on one occasion; and (5) Russell Watkins,
another of her mother's boyfriends, had been convicted of raping and sexually abus-
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At trial, the jury convicted LaJoie of first-degree rape,
sodomy, and sexual abuse of VN and sentenced him to consecutive terms totaling 45 years with a mandatory minimum
sentence of 10 years. 20 LaJoie appealed his conviction to the
Oregon Court of Appeals claiming that the trial court's ruling
to exclude certain evidence under the notice provision of Oregon's Rule 412 denied him his Sixth Amendment Confrontation 21 and Compulsory Process 22 rights as well as his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. 23 The Oregon Court of
Appeals summarily affirmed the trial court's ruling. 24
LaJoie petitioned for review by the Oregon Supreme
Court. 25 The Oregon Supreme Court granted discretionary review and affirmed the Oregon Court of Appeals. 26 On Deceming VN. [d. LaJoie did not meet the exceptions under Rule 412's notice requirement
for newly discovered evidence or evidence relating to a new issue because the court
determined that LaJoie's attorney learned of the evidence well before the deadline
and LaJoie admitted that the evidence was known to defense counsel well in advance
of the notice deadline. [d. at 675. See also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
20 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667. First-degree rape and sodomy are Class A felonies
and first-degree sexual abuse is a Class B felony. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.375,
163.405, and 163.427 (West 2000). The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence
of imprisonment for a Class A felony is 20 years and for a Class B felony, 10 years.
See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.605(1).(2) (West 2000).
21 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667. See also supra note 5 and accompanying text. The
main purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure a criminal defendant the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses testifying against him. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at
668 (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-679 (1986)).
22 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667. See also supra note 5 and accompanying text. The
United States Supreme Court has held that the Compulsory Process Clause guarantees at a minimum that criminal defendant have the right to the government's assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to
put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668 (citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987)).
23 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667. See also supra note 4 and accompanying text. The
Ninth Circuit in LaJoie v. Thompson articulated that whether directly rooted in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or
Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. See LaJoie, 217
F.3d at 668 (citing Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986».
24 See State v. LaJoie, 804 P.2d 1230 (1991) (affirmed LaJoie's conviction without
published opinion).
26 See LaJoie, 849 P.2d at 480.
26 See id. at 490. The Oregon Supreme Court, in a divided 4-3 decision, held that
an defendant's failure to give statutorily mandated notice under Rule 412 requires a
trial court to refuse to allow the accused to present such evidence at trial and this re-
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ber 31, 1996, LaJoie filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus alleging that the trial court's ruling to exclude evidence offered under Rule 412 violated his Sixth Amendment
rights of confrontation and compulsory process and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. 27 The United States
District Court for the District of Oregon denied LaJoie's petition. 2s LaJoie appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 29 The Ninth Circuit granted requirement is constitutional. [d. The Oregon Supreme Court found that the process required by Rule 412 for the admission of evidence of past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of a sexual crime is neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the
purposes that it is intended to serve. [d. The Oregon Supreme Court further found
that the process established by Rule 412 is a reasonable condition on the defendant's
right to present evidence and is justified by legitimate state interests in avoiding undue trial delay and in protecting the alleged victims of sexual crimes from harassment. [d. Moreover, the Court found that Rule 412 contains adequate mechanisms
for excusing noncompliance in those situations in which the noncompliance occurs for
reasons beyond the defendant's control. See LaJoie, 849 P.2d at 490. The dissent argued that the case should be remanded for the trial court to make the necessary judicial inquiry and pertinent findings within the special procedural framework; as set
forth in Rule 412(3), within which the admissibility of the alleged victim's prior sexual conduct must be determined. [d. at 499. The dissent found that strict application
of the statutory rule, as required by the majority, violates the federal constitution. [d.
27 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667. LaJoie filed his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 US.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. [d. A person may file a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that he or she is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States once he or she has exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the State or there is an absence of available
State corrective process; or circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to
protect the rights of the applicant. See 28 US.C. § 2254(a) and (b) (West 2000). The
United States Supreme Court, any justice thereof, may consider writs of habeas
corpus the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.
See 28 US.C. § 2254(a). LaJoie properly petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon as he alleged that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution of the United States. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667.
28 US.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) provides that "an application for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in a State court proceeding." 28 US.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
28 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667 (petition denied without published opinion).
29 See id.
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view of the district court's decision to deny LaJoie's petition
for writ of habeas corpus, challenging his conviction for rape,
sodomy, and sexual abuse of a minor child. 30

III.
A.

BACKGROUND

HABEAS CORPUS

Historically, common law courts used the writ of habeas
corpus to protect and extend their own jurisdiction. 31 Presently, state prisoners seek habeas corpus relief attacking the
validity of fact or the length of his or her confinement after
the prisoner has exhausted all available state court remedies
or the prisoner shows circumstances that render available
State processes ineffective to protect his or her rights. 32 The
30 See id. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon issued a
certificate of appealability. See id. The certificate of appealability certifies the issues
to be considered by the Ninth Circuit on appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 22(b)(1); 9th Cir.
R. 22-1(a)-(d). The district court issues the certificate of appealability when petitioner's claims have been adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings, which'
is a necessary prerequisite to obtain relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l). See Canales
v. Roe, 151 F.3d 1226, 1227-1228 (9th Cir. 1998); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Ninth
Circuit has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at
667. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 the courts of appeals have jurisdiction of appeals from
all final decisions of the district courts of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The final order in a habeas corpus proceeding is subject to review by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253. The circuit
court reviews de novo a district court's decision to grant or deny a § 2254 habeas petition. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667.
31 See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58-59 (1967). Habeas corpus was a commonlaw writ prior to its statutory establishment by the Habeas Corpus Act of May 27,
1679, and was recognized in the federal Constitution and regulated by former §§ 451
to 456 (now § 2241 et seq.) of Title 28.
32 See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 477 (1973). Federal habeas relief is dependent upon an unconstitutional state court adjudication because a state prisoner's
right to federal habeas relief is created by the entry of an unconstitutional state
court judgment subjecting the prisoner to incarceration or death. See Jeffries v. Wood,
114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. Section
2241 defines what persons are eligible for habeas corpus relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
It provides in pertinent part:
"(a) writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the United States Supreme
Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their
respective jurisdictions; (b) the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, and any
circuit judge may decline to entertain an application for a writ of habeas
corpus and may transfer the application for hearing and determination to the
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habeas corpus statute authorizes a federal court to issue a
writ of habeas corpus to require the agency holding the applicant in custody to produce witnesses to testify at a hearing. 33
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
district court having jurisdiction to entertain it; (c) the writ of habeas corpus
shall not extend to a prisoner unless: (1) he is in custody under or by color of
the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court
thereof; or (2) he is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an
Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of
the United States; or (3) he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States." [d.
Section 2254 defines the applicability of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. It provides in pertinent part:
"(a) the United States Supreme Court, a justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a
district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States; (b)(1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus
on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
shall not be granted unless it appears that-(A) the applicant has exhausted
the remedies available in the courts of the State; or (B)(i) there is an absence
of available State corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render
such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant; (d) an application
for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim---(l) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that
was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding; and (e)(1) in a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made
by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The application shall have
the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing
evidence." [d.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 which applies to
LaJoie's petition, a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the relevant
state-court decision was either (1) contrary to ... clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or (2) involved an unreasonable application of. . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States. See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In a federal habeas proceeding the standard for determining whether habeas relief must be granted is
whether . . . the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507
U.S. 619, 623 (1993)).
33 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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(hereinafter, "AEDPA"), became law on April 26, 1996 and applies to petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed after that
date. 34 A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus only
if the State court's decision was either contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of Federal law as established by
the Supreme Court of the United States. 35
1. Contrary to Clearly Established Federal Law

In Williams v. Taylor,36 the United States Supreme Court
spelled out the meaning of the "contrary to" clearly established federal law clause. 37 The Court first cited the dictionary
definition of the word "contrary" to mean diametrically different from, mutually opposed to, or opposite in character or nature,38 The Court next examined the text of § 2254(d)(1) which
requires that the state court's decision must be substantially
different from the relevant precedent of the United States Supreme Court.39 Accordingly, a state court's decision will be
34 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, PUB.L. NO. 104132, 110 Stat. 1214. See also Wood, 114 F.3d at 1493-1494 (9th Cir. 1997). In Wood,
the Ninth Circuit held, in line with the Second, Third and Tenth Circuits, that the
AEDPA cannot be applied retroactively to actions filed prior to the enactment date.
See Wood, 114 F.3d at 1493-1494. See generally Boria v. Keane, 90 F.3d 36, 38 (2d Cir.
1996); Burkett v. Love, 89 F.3d 135, 138 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996); Edens v. Hannigan, 87
F.3d 1109, 1112 n.1 (10th Cir. 1996). Accordingly, the AEDPA applies to LaJoie's petition for a writ of habeas corpus because he filed it after the AEDPA's effective date of
April 24, 1996. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667. In the AEDPA, Congress placed a restriction on the federal courts' power to grant writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners.
See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 427-428 (2000). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), prohibits
a federal court from granting an application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect
to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless that adjudication "resulted
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
35 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See also supra note 28 and accompanying text. The
Court has determined that the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" clauses
are accorded independent meaning. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 425.
36
529 U.S. 362 (2000).
37 See id.
38 See id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 495 (1976)).
39 See Williams, 529 U.S. at 424. The Williams Court found Williams' constitutionally guaranteed right to effective assistance of counsel was established at the
time his state court conviction became final. See id. Therefore, if his trial lawyer's
failure to investigate and to present substantial mitigating evidence to the sentencing
jury was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of established law, Wil-
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contrary to clearly established United States Supreme Court
precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the
governing law set forth in United States Supreme Court
cases. 40 In addition, a state court's decision is contrary to
clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent if
that court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the United States Supreme
Court, but nevertheless arrives at a different result from that
of established United States Supreme Court precedent.41 In
Van Tran v. Lindsey,42 the Ninth Circuit noted Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Williams that articulated the distinct
meanings of the "contrary to" and "unreasonable application
of" clauses in § 2254(d)(1).43 The Ninth Circuit reiterated the
rule articulated by the Court in Williams: a state court's decision is "contrary to" federal law if it either 1) fails to apply
the correct controlling authority, or 2) applies the controlling
authority to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but nonetheless reaches
a different result. 44
liams was entitled to habeas relief. See id. at 415-416. The Court found that Williams
was entitled to relief because his counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence deprived him of his constitutionally protected right to provide mitigating evidence to
the sentencing jury in his murder trial. [d. at 420-42l.
40 See id. at 425-426. In Williams, Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the
Court as to part II. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 424. Her opinion, which was cited by
the Ninth Circuit in LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667-668, used the Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington to illustrate when a state court's decision will be contrary to
clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent. See Williams, 529 U.S. at
425-426; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). Her opinion in Williams
stated that if a State court rejected a prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established by a preponderance of
the evidence that the result of his criminal trial would have been different, that
State court decision would be "contrary to" clearly established United States Supreme
Court precedent because the Court held in Strickland that a prisoner only must
demonstrate a "reasonable probability that . . . the result would have been different." See Williams, 529 U.S. at 425-426; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

4'

See Williams, 529 U.S. at 426.

42

212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000).

43

See id. at 1150 .

.. See id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 425-426; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
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2. Unreasonable Application

In Williams v. Taylor,45 Justice O'Connor defined the
meaning of the "unreasonable application of" clause of §
2254(d)(1).46 She stated that when a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of the United States Supreme
Court to the facts of the applicant's case, the reviewing federal court may conclude that the state court decision falls
within § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause.47 The
Williams court held that the reviewing federal court must inquire whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable. 48 Justice
O'Connor emphasized that an unreasonable application of federal law differs from an incorrect application of federal law. 49
Accordingly, under the "unreasonable application" clause of §
2254(d)(1), the State court's application of clearly established
federal law must be erroneous or incorrect as well as objectively unreasonable. 50
The Ninth Circuit in Van Tran v. Lindsey5l applied Justice O'Connor's definition of "unreasonable application" in Williams. 52 However, the Ninth Circuit recognized, as did the
529 u.s. 362 (2000).
See id. at 427-429.
47 See id. at 427.
48 See id. at 428. The Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's subjective "reasonable
jurists" test in Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 1998) that a State court
decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law only
if the State court applied the Federal law in a manner that reasonable jurists would
all agree is unreasonable. [d. at 427-428. The Court found that this "all reasonable
jurists" standard would mislead federal habeas courts by focusing their attention on
a subjective rather than on an objective one. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 428.
49 See id. Justice O'Connor explained that a "state court's incorrect legal determination has [never] been allowed to stand because it was reasonable." [d. at 429. She
emphasized that "Congress specifically used the word 'unreasonable,' and not a term
like 'erroneous' or 'incorrect.' " [d. Justice O'Connor further stated that under the
"unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may not issue a writ of
habeas corpus simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that
the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously
or incorrectly, rather, the application must also be unreasonable. [d.
50 See Williams, 529 U.S. at 429.
61 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000).
62 See id. at 1150. See also LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667-68; Williams, 529 U.S. at 427.
A state court's decision can involve an "unreasonable application" of federal law if it
either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of
46

46
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Court in Williams, that these two categories could overlap
making it difficult to determine whether a State court's decision unreasonably extended a rule to a new context or simply
contradicted controlling authority. 53

3. Error Must Have Substantial and Injurious Effect or
Influence
Once error has been found, the reviewing federal court
must find that the error had a substantial and injurious effect
or influence on the jury's verdict. 54 In Kotteakos v. United
States,55 the Court considered whether the petitioners suffered
substantial prejudice from being convicted of a single general
conspiracy when the evidence, as conceded by the Government, proved not one, but eight or more different conspiracies
of the same sort executed through a common key figure. 56 The
Court held that the error's effect must be weighed against the
entire setting of the record in relation to the judgment. 57 The
inquiry must be whether the particular error had substantial
influence on the jury.58 The Court concluded that the error
permeated the entire trial and those petitioners' rights not to
be tried collectively for the group of distinct and separate offenses was substantially affected. 59 Therefore, the Court found
it highly probable that the error had a substantial and injurifacts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or 2) extends or fails to extend a
clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable. See Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1150.
63 See Van Tran, 212 F.3d at 1150. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 427. The Ninth
Circuit further noted that in some cases the reviewing federal court may have difficulty distinguishing between a State court decision that is contrary to clearly established Federal law or that constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law. See VanTran, 212 F.3d at 1150. In those cases it will be necessary
for the reviewing federal court to test the petitioner's allegations against both standards. [d. at 1150.
64 See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993).
66 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
66 See id. at 752.
67 See id. at 764. The Court articulated that the reviewing court must take into
account what the error meant to the jury, not singled out and standing alone. [d.
58 See id. The Court emphasized that if "one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the
whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible
to conclude that substantial rights were not affected." Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765.
69 See id. at 769, 775.
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ous effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict and
granted habeas relief. 60
In Brecht v. Abrahamson,61 the Court addressed whether
the State's erroneous references to the defendant's postMiranda silence during the trial for impeachment purposes
substantially influenced the jury's verdict. 62 The Court applied
the "substantial and injurious effect or influence" standard
and concluded that the error committed at Brecht's trial did
not substantially influence the jury's verdict because, when
considering the record as a whole, the State's references to
Brecht's post-Miranda silence were infrequent and were, in effect, merely cumulative of the extensive and permissible references to his pre-Miranda silence. 63 Accordingly, the Court did
not grant habeas relief. 64
B.

CLEARLY ESTABLISHED FEDERAL LAW

The Court has traditionally been reluctant to impose constitutional restraints on ordinary evidentiary rulings by state
trial courtS. 65 The Court has consistently held that the Constitution reserves wide latitude to trial judges in criminal trials
to exclude evidence that' is repetitive, poses an undue risk of
harassment, prejudice or confusion of the issues, or is only
See id. at 776.
507 U.S. 619 (1993).
62 See id. at 622-23. At Brecht's trial for first-degree murder he testified that he
shot the victim, but claimed that it was an accident. [d. at 624. During crossexamination the state made references to Brecht's pre-Miranda silence because he
failed to mention to anyone that the shooting had been an accident. [d. at 625. The
state's closing argument made references to both Brecht's pre-Miranda and post-Miranda silence. See id. The Court held that the state's error did not warrant habeas
relief because the improper references to Brecht's post-Miranda silence were infrequent when considered in the context of all the evidence, and therefore, did not substantially influence the jury's verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 639.
63 See id. The Court also found that the evidence of Brecht's guilt was certainly
weighty, if not overwhelming, and that circumstantial evidence also pointed to his
guilt. [d.
64 See id.
65 See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689 (1986). The Court reasoned that in
any given criminal case a trial judge must make dozens, and sometimes hundreds, of
decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence. [d. at 689. Therefore, the Court is
reluctant to impose constitutional restraints on ordinary evidentiary rulings by state
trial court. [d.
60
6l
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marginally relevant. 66 Furthermore, the Court has never questioned the State's power to exclude evidence through evidentiary rules that serve the interests of fairness and reliability.67
1. Rape Shield Statutes
a. General Character Evidence Rules
Generally, evidence of the character or reputation of a
party has long been held to be legally irrelevant in determining a controversy, and therefore, inadmissible. 68 Historically,
as an exception to this rule, evidence of the victim's general
reputation for chastity could be admitted in a prosecution for
rape. 69 Today, rape shield statutes have been enacted by the
Federal Rules of Evidence and by most states which bar or
limit the admissibility of evidence of the victim's past sexual
history or reputation. 70 Rape shield statutes reflect the judgment that most evidence about chastity has far too little probative value on the issue of consent to justify extensive and
66 See generally Crane, 476 U.S. at 689-690; Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679. Federal
. Rule of Evidence 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger or unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. FED. R. EVID. 403.
67 See Crane, 476 U.S. at 690; Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
68 See 29 AM. JUR. Evidence § 363 (2d 1994). Federal Rule of Evidence 404 provides in relevant part that "evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion . . . except evidence of a particular character trait of the victim of the
crime offered by the accused . . . " FED. R. EVID. 404. Oregon Revised Statute §
40.170 (also known as Oregon Evidence Code Rule 404) provides in relevant part
that: "(1) evidence of a person's character or trait of character is admissible when it
is an essential element of a charge, claim or defense; (2) evidence of a person's character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, except: (b) evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused." OR. REV. STAT. § 40.170.
69 See 29 AM. JUR. Evidence § 373 (2d 1994). This evidence was admissible to
show consent. See id. See also FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) and OR. REV. STAT. §
40.170(2)(b) (Rule 404). Both Federal Rule of Evidence 404 and Oregon Evidence
Code 404 provide that a defendant may offer evidence of a pertinent character trait
of the victim of the crime that allows a defendant to introduce evidence of the victim's general reputation for chastity to prove consent. See id. See also supra note 68
and accompanying text.
70 See 1 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 193, at 822 (4th ed. 1992).
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intrusive inquiry into a victim's sexual history. 71

h. Rape Shield Statutes
Oregon has enacted an exclusionary rape shield statute. 72
Oregon's Rule 412 primarily seeks to protect victims of sexual
crimes from degrading and embarrassing disclosure of intimate details about their private lives. 73 However, certain exceptions enumerated in Oregon's Rule 412 allow for the admissibility of specific types of evidence of the sexual history
and sexual predisposition of the victim for limited purposes. 74
71 See generally United States v. Driver, 581 F.2d 80, 81 (4th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 271-272 (8th Cir. 1978); State ex reI. Pope v. Superior
Court, 545 P.2d 946, 950-951 (Ariz. 1976).
72 See OR. REv. STAT. § 40.210 (OR. EVID. CODE Rule 412). See text accompanying
note 8. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 is similar. See FED. R. EVID. 412. It provides in
relevant part: "(a)(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in
other sexual behavior; or (a)(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual
predisposition, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged
sexual misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c)." [d.
73 See LaJoie, 849 P.2d at 489. Oregon's Rule 412 is also intended to encourage
victims of sexual misconduct to report and assist in the prosecution of the crime ,by
preventing highly prejudicial evidence from reaching the jury and thus helping to
protect jury impartiality. [d. The statute serves legitimate state interests in protecting the victim because the prospect of having past sexual conduct divulged affects not
only the victim's decision to report the sex crime but also the victim's willingness to
see the process through. [d. at 483-484. The purposes of Federal Rule of Evidence
412 are similar. See FED. R. EVID. 412, Advisory Committee Notes. Federal Rule of
Evidence 412 aims to safeguard the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy,
potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the factfinding process. [d. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 is constructed to achieve the objectives of carefully balancing the victim's interests in retaining some privacy and dignity with the defendant's constitutional rights under the Fourteenth and Sixth
Amendments to present a complete defense and of encouraging victims of sexual misconduct to institute and to participate in legal proceedings against alleged offenders.
See FED. R. EVID. 412, Congressional Discussion.
74 See OR. REV. STAT. § 40.210 (Rule 412(b» which provides that evidence of a
victim's past sexual conduct is admissible if it: (A) relates to the motive or bias of the
alleged victim; or (B) Is necessary to rebut or explain scientific or medical evidence
offered by the state; or (C) Is otherwise constitutionally required to be admitted. [d.
Similarly, Federal Rule of Evidence 412 allows some evidence of the sexual history of
the victim to be admitted for limited purposes. See FED. R. EVID. 412. Federal Rule of
Evidence 412 provides: "under 412(b)(1)(A), evidence of specific instances of sexual
behavior by the alleged victim offered to prove that a person other the accused was
the source of semen, injury or other physical evidence is admissible in a criminal
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The exceptions to Oregon's Rule 412 demonstrate the balance
that the statute strikes between protecting the victim's interests and the defendant's constitutional rights to a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense. 75
The fifteen day notice requirement in Oregon Rule 412
was also designed to serve the state's legitimate interests, including protecting alleged victims of sex based crimes from
surprise. 76 In addition, the procedure is justified by legitimate
state interests, including the interests in avoiding undue trial
delay and in protecting the alleged victims of sexual crimes
from harassment. 77 Moreover, the exceptions built into the
procedural framework of the fifteen-day notice requirement
serve to protect the constitutional interests of the defendant
case; likewise, under 412(b)(1)(B) evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by
the alleged victim with respect to the person of the accused of the sexual misconduct
offered by the accused to prove consent or by the prosecution is admissible; and
under 412(b)(1)(C), evidence the exclusion of which would violate the constitutional
rights of the defendant is admissible." Id.
75 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 670-671. The defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
present relevant testimony may, in appropriate circumstances, bo~ to accommodate
other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. Id. at 668. Restrictions on a
criminal defendant's right to confront witnesses and to present relevant evidence are
constitutional so long as they are not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes
they are designed to serve. Id. Before enacting Federal Rule of Evidence 412, Congress made specific findings regarding the constitutional issues surrounding the federal rape shield law. See FED. R. EVID. 412, Congressional Discussion. Congress found
in relevant part: The principal purpose of this legislation is to protect rape victims
from the degrading and embarrassing disclosure of intimate details about their private lives and it does so by narrowly circumscribing when such evidence may be admitted. Id. Rule 412 does not sacrifice any constitutional right possessed by the
defendant because it fairly balances the interests involved - the rape victim's interest
in protecting her private life from unwarranted public exposure; the defendant's interest in being able adequately to present a defense by offering relevant and probative evidence; and society's interest in a fair trial, one where unduly prejudicial evidence is not permitted to becloud the issues before the jury." Id.
76 See LaJoie, 849 P.2d at 483-484. The notice requirement in Oregon's Rule 412
serves a number of functions including: requiring the defendant to tell the prosecutor
and the court in advance of trial of his intention to use certain evidence and to ask
that it be admitted at trial; providing all of the parties with notice of what the
defendant intends to prove at trial so that all parties will know what is at issue;
preventing surprise to the prosecutor, the victim and the court; allowing the prosecutor to weigh the evidence and to prepare arguments against its admission; and most
importantly to protect against surprise, harassment and undue delay. Id.
77 See id.
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in preventing a full and complete defense. 78
Michigan u. Lucas,79 demonstrated the role these legitimate state interests play in a sexual assault case. 80 In Lucas,
the Court balanced the competing interests of the alleged victim and the defendant under Michigan's rape shield statute. 81
The defendant, Lucas, was convicted of criminal sexual conduct. 82 At Lucas' trial, the court prohibited Lucas from introducing evidence of a prior sexual relationship between himself
and the victim because Lucas failed to comply with the rape
shield statute's 10-day notice and hearing requirements. 83 The
Court held that restrictions on a criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights may not be arbitrary or disproportionate
to the purposes they were designed to serve. 84 The Court con78 See id. at 489. The legislature created two exceptions to the requirement of 15
days' notice - the evidence is newly discovered or the issue is newly arisen - which
apply when the defendant cannot comply for reasons beyond the defendant's control
thus protecting the defendant's constitutional right to present a full defense to the
jury.ld.
79 500 US. 145 (1991).
80 See id. at 147.
81 See id. at 146. The Lucas Court analyzed Michigan's rape shield statute that
prohibited a criminal defendant from introducing at trial evidence of an alleged rape
victim's past sexual conduct subject to two exceptions. Id. See also MICH. COMPo LAws
§ 750.520j (1979). Those two exceptions are: "(1) evidence of the victim's past sexual
conduct with the actor; and (2) evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease." Id. If the defendant proposes to offer evidence under one of these two exceptions, the defendant must file a
written motion and an offer or proof within 10 days after he is arraigned. Id. The
trial court may order an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is material and not more prejudicial than probative. Id.
82 See Lucas, 500 US. at 146.
83 See id.
84 See id. at 151. The Lucas Court articulated what is known as the "Lucas test,"
that restrictions on a criminal defendant's right to confront witnesses and to present
relevant evidence may not be "arbitrary or disproportionate" to the purposes they
were designed to serve. Id. at 151. Several United States Supreme Court cases
demonstrate restrictions on criminal defendants' rights that are not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes the restrictions were designed to serve: in Taylor v. Illi·
nois, the Court held that preclusion of a defense witness' testimony as a sanction for
defense counsel's failure to disclose the witness to the prosecution in pretrial discovery was not arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes that the discovery rules
were designed to serve. See 484 US. 400, 408-412 (1998). The Court stated that the
rules providing for pretrial discovery serve the same purpose as the defendant's right
to compulsory process, to ensure that the ends of justice are met by a full and fair
presentation of the facts. Id. at 411. Notably, the Court emphasized that "the Sixth
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cluded that Michigan's rape shield statute does not per se violate the Sixth Amendment. 8s Importantly, the Court noted
that Michigan's rape shield statute represents a valid legislative determination that rape victims deserve heightened protection against harassment, surprise, and unnecessary invasions of privacy.86 Therefore, in a sexual assault case when
the prosecutor seeks to exclude evidence under a rape shield
statute, the victim's as well as the state's interests must be
balanced with the defendant's constitutional rights and
interests. 87

2. Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause
The Court has established that under the Compulsory
Process Clause, criminal defendants have the right to the government's assistance in compelling the attendance of
favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before the
jury evidence that might influence the determination of
Amendment does not confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate
demands of the adversarial system." Id. at 412-413 (citing United States v. Nobles,
422 US. 225, 241 (1975)). See also Ritchie, 480 US. at 54 (1987) (restriction on criminal defendant's right to examine the victim's Children's and Youth Services file was
not arbitrary or disproportionate where defense counsel was able to cross-examine all
the trial witnesses fully); United States v. Scheffer, 523 US. 303, 305-309 (1998)
(trial court's exclusion of defendant's polygraph examination results did not violate
Sixth Amendment rights because Federal Rule of Evidence 707 which excludes evidence of polygraph examinations is not arbitrary or disproportionate to serving the
legitimate interests of ensuring that only reliable evidence is introduced at trial, preserving the jury's role in determining credibility, and avoiding litigation that is collateral to the primary purpose of the trial).
85 See Lucas, 500 US. at 153. The Court reversed the Michigan Court of Appeals'
per se rule that the notice requirement in Michigan's rape shield law violated the
Sixth Amendment in all cases where it was used to preclude evidence of past sexual
conduct between a rape victim and a criminal defendant. See id. at 146, 149-153. The
Lucas Court recognized that in appropriate cases, criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment right to present relevant testimony may bow to accommodate other legitimate
interests in the criminal trial process. See id. at 149.
86 See id. at 150. The Court also found that the statute protects against surprise
to the prosecution. Id. Moreover, the notice and hearing procedure contained in the
rape shield statute allows the trial court to determine in advance of trial whether the
evidence is material and whether its prejudicial nature outweighs its probative value.
See Lucas, 500 US. at 150.
87 See id.
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guilt.88 Several Court cases have addressed the effect of rape
shield statutes on a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment
compulsory process rights. 89
In Taylor v. Illinois,90 the Court considered whether a
court order precluding a defense witness' testimony as a sanction, because defense counsel failed to comply with a discovery rule, violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment compulsory process rights. 91 In Taylor, defense counsel failed to list a
witness in response to the state's pretrial discovery request
and the trial judge refused to allow the undisclosed witness to
testify.92 The Court held that the lower court did not commit
constitutional error. 93 The Court acknowledged that the
defendant's right to present witnesses in his own defense is
essential to the adversary system itself.94_However, a criminal
defendant does not have the unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence. 95 Considering the doubtful veracity of the witness' testimony, the Court found that
precluding the defense witness from testifying constituted an
appropriate sanction for counsel's violation of the discovery
rules and did not violate compulsory process. 96
88

89

See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
See generally Taylor v. Illinois, 484 US. 400, 401 (1988) and Crane, 476 US. at

684.
484 U.S. 400 (1988).
See id. at 401-402.
92 See id.
93 See id. at 402. The Taylor Court found that preclusion of the witness' testimony as a sanction for a discovery violation is not absolutely prohibited by the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment. [d.
94 See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 408-409 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 US. 683,
709 (1974». The Taylor Court reasoned that because this country has elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues
before a court of law, the need to develop all relevant facts in this system is both fundamental and comprehensive. [d. The Court also found that the function of the courts
requires that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence, needed
either by the prosecution or the defense. [d. Furthermore, the integrity of the judicial
system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts
within the framework of the rules of evidence. [d.
95 See id. at 410.
98 See Taylor, 484 US. at 416-417. The Court doubted the veracity of the undisclosed witness' testimony because he was proffered by the defense as an eyewitness,
however, his testimony outside the presence of the jury dramatically contradicted defense counsel's representations to the trial court. [d. at 404-405.
90

91
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Similarly in Crane v. Kentucky, 97 the Court addressed
whether the Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause
had been violated. 98 Crane sought to introduce evidence of the
circumstances surrounding his confession to cast doubt on the
validity and credibility of his confession. 99 The Court relied on
prior decisions to re-state the long-standing rule that the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.lOo Accordingly, exclusion
of this kind of exculpatory evidence, in the absence of any
valid state justification, deprived the defendant of the right to
test the prosecutor's case through the presentation of all relevant evidence. lol
476 u.s. 683 (1986).
See id. at 684. In Crane, a unanimous Court reversed the decision of the Kentucky Supreme Court, which had affirmed Crane's conviction, and remanded to the
trial court to determine whether exclusion of the testimony was harmless error. [d. at
691.
99 See id. at 685. The trial court excluded evidence of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's confession. See id. at 684. The trial court denied Crane's
motion to suppress his confession to police having found that the confession was voluntary. See Crane, 476 U.S. at 685. Those circumstances were: he had been detained
in a windowless room for a protracted period of time; he had been surrounded by as
many as six police officers; he had repeatedly requested and been denied permission
to telephone his mother; and he had been badgered into making a false confession.
[d. The trial court refused to allow Crane to introduce evidence of these circumstances because the court rejected Crane's theory that the evidence was relevant to
cast doubt on the validity and credibility of Crane's confession. [d. at 686.
100 See id. at 690. A criminal defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right to
present a complete defense is rooted in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as well as in the Compulsory Process and Confrontation clauses of the
Sixth Amendment. See generally Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967); Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). See
also infra text accompanying note 145. The Court stated that an essential component
of procedural fairness is the opportunity to be heard. See Crane, 476 U.S. at 690. The
Court further articulated that this opportunity would be empty if the State were allowed to exclude competent, reliable evidence bearing on the credibility of a confession when such evidence is central to the defendant's claim of innocence. [d.
101 See id. at 690-691. The Court found that criminal defendant's have the right
to have the prosecutor's case encounter and "survive the crucible" of meaningful adversarial testing, therefore, the exclusion of exculpatory evidence, in the absence of
valid state justification, deprives a criminal defendant of this right. [d.
97

98
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3. Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause ensures a
criminal defendant the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses testifying against him.102 The opportunity guaranteed
to a criminal defendant to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him is important in an adversarial system
to produce a full and fair presentation of the facts.103 The
right to cross-examine ensures that the evidence admitted
against the accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing that is a staple of American criminal proceedings. l04 The United States Supreme Court has fully analyzed this Sixth Amendment right in several cases. 105
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,106 the Court considered
whether the trial court violated the Ritchie's right of crossexamination by denying him information necessary to prepare
his defense. 107 At trial, Ritchie sought disclosure of the alleged
victim's Children and Youth Services file, on the grounds that
the information in the file might contain the names of
favorable witnesses, in addition to other unspecified exculpatory evidence. lOB The trial judge refused to order Children and
Youth Services to disclose the files to the defendant.l09 In
Ritchie, the Court analyzed whether the failure to disclose the
contents of the file violated Ritchie's confrontation and compulsory process rights. 110 The Court found that its own prece102 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668 (citing Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678-679 (1986)).
See also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
103 See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680. In Van Arsdall, the Court found that a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different perspective of the witness'
credibility if the trial court had allowed defense counsel to engage in appropriate
cross-examination. See id. at 680.
104 See Tague v. Richards, 3 F.3d 1133, 1138 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Maryland v.
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 846 (1990)).
105 See generally Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 39 and VanArsdall, 475 U.S. at 678.
106 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
107 See id. at 42-43. The Court in Ritchie addressed whether and to what extent a
State's interest in the confidentiality of its investigative files concerning child abuse
must yield to a criminal defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to discover favorable evidence. Id.
108 See id. at 44.
109 See id.
110 See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 45. The Ritchie Court analyzed, under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, Ritchie's claim that the failure to disclose the con-
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dent establishes that the Compulsory Process Clause guarantees that criminal defendants have the "right to the
government's assistance in compelling the attendance of
favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before a jury
evidence that might influence the determination of guilt."111
Therefore, the Ritchie Court concluded that because defense
counsel cross-examined all of the trial witnesses fully, the
trial court's failure to disclose the file did not violate the
defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. ll2
To the contrary in Delaware v. Van Arsdall,113 the Court
found a violation of the Confrontation Clause.H4 The Court
held that the trial court violated Van Arsdall's confrontation
rights by prohibiting his inquiry into the possibility that a
witness was biased as a result of the state's dismissal of that
witness' pending public drunkenness charge. 115 The Court further stated that a trial judge may impose some limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution
witness, however, the trial judge may not prohibit all inquiry
tents of the file violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation and compulsory process
rights because the Sixth Amendment guarantees are applied to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. See infra note 115 and
accompanying text.
11l See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56. See generally Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284 (1973); Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 100 (1972); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14 (1967).
112 See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 54. The Court emphasized that the Confrontation
Clause guarantees the opportunity for effective cross-examination, not crossexamination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense
might wish. Id. The Court explained that the Confrontation Clause guarantees a
criminal defendant the opportunity for an effective cross-examination because this
right "means more than being allowed to confront the witnesses physically." See
VanArsdall, 475 U.S. at 678. The Court found that a defendant many not crossexamine in any way he sees fit because the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit
reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns about harassment,
prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Id. at 679.
113 475 U.S. 673 (1986).
114 See id. at 679.
115 See id. at 679. The Court found the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
guarantees a criminal defendant the right to be confronted with the witnesses
against him as well as the opportunity"to cross-examine those witnesses. See id. at
678 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-316 (1974». The Court also recognized
that the exposure of a witness's motivation is a proper and important function of the
constitutionally protected right of cross-examination." See id. at 678-679.
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by defense counsel into the possible bias of a prosecution witness as the trial court did in Van Ardsall without violating
the Confrontation Clause.1l6 Therefore, a trial judge's complete prohibition of a criminal defendant's line of crossexamination violates the Confrontation Clause.ll7
Similarly, in Agard v. Portuondo,118 the Seventh Circuit
addressed a criminal defendant's confrontation clause rights
in the context of a trial court's denial of defense counsel's
cross-examination under New York's rape shield law.1 19 In
Agard, the trial court denied defense counsel's attempt to
cross-examine the victim on whether she had ever engaged in
anal intercourse with persons other than the defendant.12o
The court ruled that the rape shield statute proscribed defense counsel's inquiry into the victim's prior sexual history
and that any probative value was far exceeded by the
prejudice. 121 The court noted that a state might restrict a
defendant's right to introduce evidence without violating the
defendant's constitutional right to present a defense if the restrictions are neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the
purposes they are designed to serve. 122 Accordingly, the court
116 See VanArsdall, 475 US. at 679. The Court stressed that the Constitution entitles a defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one. [d. at 681; See generally United
States v. Hasting, 461 US. 499, 508-509 (1983); Bruton v. United States, 391 US.
123, 135 (1968».
117 See VanArsdall, 475 US. at 679.
118 117 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 1997).
119 See id. at 702.
120 See id.
121 See id. The trial court also rejected Agard's request that the testimony be allowed with a limiting instruction to the jury. [d. Agard asserted that the trial court's
ruling violated his constitutional rights to confrontation and due process because it
denied him the ability to present a complete defense. See Agard, 117 F.3d at 702.
New York's rape shield law relied upon by the trial court in Agard, bars the use of
evidence at trial of an alleged victim's prior sexual conduct with persons other than
the defendant, but grants the trial court discretion to admit such evidence in the interest of justice. [d. See generally N.Y. CRIM. !>Roc. LAw § 60.42 (McKinney 1992).
However, this discretionary power granted to the trial court must be exercised within
the boundaries of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Agard, 117 F.3d at 702.
122 See Agard, 117 F.3d at 702. (citing Rock v. Arkansas, 483 US. 44, 55-56
(1987». The court found that rape shield laws exemplified the trial court's traditional
power to exclude evidence when the prejudicial character far exceeds its probative
value. [d. at 703. The Seventh Circuit recognized that rape shield laws serve the purpose of protecting victims of rape from harassment and embarrassment in court to
encourage women to report these crimes. [d. The court found that rape shield laws
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held that the trial court did not violate Agard's confrontation
rights by limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of the
victim because application of the rape shield statute was
neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the purposes it was
designed to serve. 123
The Seventh Circuit also addressed a defendant's confrontation clause rights in Tague v. Richards.124 In Tague, Tague
claimed that application of Indiana's rape shield statute violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation rightS. 125 Tague had
been charged with molesting his neighbor AT., an eleven-year
old girl. 126 On cross-examination of a state witness Dr. Hibbard, Tague sought to elicit testimony that AT. had told Dr.
Hibbard that her father had molested her several years earlier.127 The trial court excluded this testimony under Indiana's
rape shield statute because it related to prior sexual acts involving AT. 128
also serve a second purpose of reinforcing the trial judge's traditional power to keep
inflammatory and distracting evidence from the jury. 1d.
123 See id. The court found that application of the rape shield statute was not arbitrary or disproportionate because of the highly prejudicial nature of the evidence.
See Agard, 117 F.3d at 703. The court recognized that evidence of more unusual sexual activities, such as anal intercourse, is likely to distract a jury from the other evidence it is asked to consider. 1d. Furthermore, the court concluded that the probative
value of the evidence was low because "it is far from clear what bearing prior consensual experience with a particular sexual practice has on the probability of trauma occurring during a subsequent non-consensual act." 1d.
124 3 F.3d 1133, 1135 (7th Cir. 1993).
125 See id. at 1135.
126 See id. at 1136.
127 See id. Dr. Hibbard, a prosecution witness, had interviewed and physically examined AT. 1d. Dr. Hibbard's examination of AT. revealed that there was extra tissue on AT's hymen and she was infected with gardnella vaginitis, a disease rarely
found in children and thought to be sexually transmitted. See Tague, 3 F.3d at 1136.
Dr. Hibbard also testified that vaginal discharge, the main symptom of the disease,
surfaced around the time of the alleged attacks by Tague and Dr. Hibbard concluded
that AT. was most likely a victim of sexual abuse. 1d. However, Dr. Hibbard also testified that she could not determine if the hymenal damage occurred three months or
three years before the examination and that other possible, but unlikely, causes of
damage existed. 1d.
128 See id. at 1137. Indiana Code § 35-37-4-4, Indiana's rape shield statute, prohibits a criminal defendant from introducing any evidence of the victim's past sexual
conduct in his defense against a sex crime charge, with the exception of evidence: (1)
of the victim's or a witness' past sexual conduct with the defendant; (2) which in a
specific instance of sexual activity shows that some person other than the defendant
committed the act upon which the prosecution is founded; or (3) that the victim's
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However, the court agreed with Tague that application of
Indiana's rape shield statute to exclude the testimony violated
his confrontation rights. 129 The court recognized that the general purpose of rape shield statutes is to exclude evidence
that, although relevant, has little probative value and a great
capacity to embarrass and distract. l3o The court acknowledged
that eliminating the risk of embarrassment furthers the
state's interest in encouraging children to report cases of molestation.131 Nevertheless, the court found that the state's interest did not outweigh Tague's constitutional right to crossexamine and thereby challenge the medical evidence offered
by the state through Dr. Hibbard's testimony.132
Likewise, in Wood v. Alaska,133 the Ninth Circuit considered whether the trial court's exclusion of evidence about the
pregnancy at the time of trial was not caused by the defendant. See IND. CODE § 3537-4-4'(a)-(b). The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the trial court's determination that
the evidence regarding A.T.'s molestation by her father did not fall within any of the
exceptions contained in Indiana's rape shield statute. See Tague, 3 F.3d at 1137.
129 See Tague, 3 F.3d at 1138. The Seventh Circuit found that application of the
rape shield statute under the circumstances in this case excluded evidence that indicated another possible source of the victim's hymenal damage, thereby significantly
hampering Tague's efforts to rebut the inferences the state asked the jury to draw
from the direct testimony of Dr. Hibbard. [d.
130 See id. at 1139. The Seventh Circuit also recognized that the type of evidence
excluded by rape shield statutes is considered to shift the balance of proof too far in
favor of the rape defendant. [d. The court also found that Indiana's rape shield statute was enacted to prevent a general inquiry into the past sexual conduct of the victim to avoid embarrassing the victim and subjecting her to possible public denigration. [d. (citing Kelly v. State, 586 N.E. 2d 927, 929 (Ind. App. 1992».
131 See Tague, 3 F.3d at 1139.
132 See id. Although the Seventh Circuit found that exclusion of the evidence violated Tague's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights, the court did not grant habeas
relief because, in light of the other evidence at trial, the error did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on his trial. [d. at 1140. The court found
that the victim testified with great detail about the occasions on which Tague attacked her and A.T.'s credibility and allegations were reinforced by the testimony of
her mother, her school counselor, and the welfare department caseworker. [d. Furthermore, the court found that the evidence of A.T.'s infection with gardnella vaginitis
supported her allegations that Tague molested her in the summer of 1986 because
vaginal discharge, a symptom of the disease, appeared several months before A.T's
examination in January 1987. [d. Accordingly, the court determined that the infringement on Tague's Sixth Amendment rights was harmless because exclusion of
the evidence did not substantially prejudice the result of his trial. See Tague, 3 F.3d
at 1140
133 957 F.2d 1544 (9th Cir. 1992).
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victim in a rape trial violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. 134 In Wood, the trial court excluded
evidence that the victim had posed in Penthouse magazine,
had acted in X-rated movies, had shown Wood the photographs and had discussed her experiences with Tague. 135 The
court recognized that although a criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights guarantee him the ability to confront and
cross-examine witnesses against him and to present a defense, those rights do not give him the right to present irrelevant evidence. 136 The court· also found that trial courts retain
the discretionary power to impose reasonable limits on crossexamination to prevent harassment, prejudice and confusion
of the issues among other things. 137 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that exclusion of the evidence did not violate
Wood's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights because the low
probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed
by its prejudicial effect. 138
In United States v. Payne,139 the Ninth Circuit also considered whether the trial court's exclusion of evidence under the
federal rape shield statute violated Payne's Sixth Amendment
confrontation rights. 140 The court examined the probative
See id. at 1545-1546.
See id. at 1547. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the evidence that the victim
posed in Penthouse and acted in pornographic movies was not relevant in itself. Id.
at 1551. However, the Ninth Circuit found that the fact that she showed Wood the
photos and discussed her acting experiences with him was relevant to establish the
nature of their relationship. Id.
136 See Wood, 957 F.2d at 1549. Relevant evidence consists of any evidence that
has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of importance more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence. See generally FED. R. EVID. 401.
137 See Wood, 957 F.2d at 1549.
138 See id. at 1552-1554. See also infra Part IV.C.l. The court found that the probative value of the evidence was low because introducing the evidence would confuse
the issues and unduly prejudice the jury. See Wood, 957 F.2d at 1552. Furthermore
the court found that because the victim's acting and modeling experiences were not
relevant in themselves, the jury could be led to base its decision on irrelevant facts.
Id. The court concluded that the evidence was highly prejudicial because if the jury
considered the evidence it could feel hostility for the victim as an immoral woman
and base its decision on that hostility rather than the facts. Id. The court also feared
that the jury could conclude that a woman with the victim's past could not be raped
or that she somehow deserved to be raped. Id. at 1552-1553.
139 944 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1991).
140 See id. at 1469. The alleged victim was Payne's 12-year old foster daughter.
See id. at 1462. The trial court excluded evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct,
134
136

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001

27

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 4

28

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1

value of the prohibited cross-examination to determine
whether Payne's confrontation rights had been violated. 141 The
court reasoned that the evidence that Payne sought to elicit
on cross-examination was of minimal probative to his claim
about the victim's bias against him.142 Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the trial court appropriately excluded
the evidence because the incident had minimal, if any probative value that was outweighed by the potential prejudicial effect to the young victim. 143 Accordingly, exclusion of the evidence did not violate Payne's Sixth Amendment confrontation
rights. 144
4. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause

The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process requires that the judicial process protect those rights that are the "very essence of the
scheme of ordered liberty" or are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."145 Due Process guarantees criminal defendants
specifically that she had been found in a trailer, partially undressed, engaging in
heavy petting with a boy. See id. at 1468. Payne contended that the evidence was admissible to show: (1) the victim's motivation to testify falsely against Payne based on
discipline arising out of the trailer incident; (2) to demonstrate the victim's lack of
credibility because of her allegedly inconsistent recounting of the incident; (3) to explain the medical evidence regarding the condition of the victim's hymen; and (4) to
rebut testimony suggesting that the victim was a virgin. [d. at 1468-1469.
141 See Payne, 944 F.2d at 1469.
142 See id. The court further noted that the trial court prohibited a "sanitized
cross-examination" about the trailer incident because the underlying facts of the incident were not relevant to the victim's purported motivation to fabricate the charges
against Payne. See id. Furthermore, the court found that evidence of the incident was
more prejudicial than probative regarding the issue of the medical evidence because
Payne did not establish that any activity that took place during the incident could offer an alternative explanation of the medical evidence. [d.
143 See id.
1« See Payne, 944 F.2d at 1469. See also infra Part V.A.
145 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-326 (1937). In LaJoie, the Ninth
Circuit limited its analysis to LaJoie's Sixth Amendment constitutional rights because the United States Supreme Court has held that whether rooted directly in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process or
Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. See LaJoie, 217
F.3d at 668 (citing Crane, 476 U.S. at 690). See also supra note 4 and accompanying
text.
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that convictions are not brought about by methods that offend
a sense of justice. 146
These important principles derive from the Court's decision in Rochin u. California. 147 In Rochin, the Court considered whether use of evidence, which had been forcibly obtained from the person of Rochin, to convict Rochin violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 148 The
deputy sheriffs directed a physician at a hospital to pump
Rochin's stomach, without his consent, to recover two capsules
containing morphine that the defendant had swallowed in the
deputy's presence. 149 The prosecutors used the capsules at
trial to obtain Rochin's conviction for illegal possession of
morphine. 150 The Court stated that the Due Process Clause requires the government to respect those personal rights that
are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of the people of
this Nation as to be considered fundamenta1. 151 Although the
Court did not articulate a more precise definition of due process, the Court stated that due process means that convictions
cannot be brought about by methods that offend a sense of
justice. 152 Accordingly, the Court determined that the method
used to obtain the capsules offended a sense of justice, therefore, Rochin's due process rights had been violated by use of
the capsules to obtain his conviction. 153
See Rochin v. California, 342 US. 165, 173 (1952).
342 US. 165, 173 (1952).
148 See id. at 166-168.
149 See id. at 166.
150 See id.
151 See id. at 169. These fundamental rights include: the right to have an abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 US. 113, 152-154 (1973); and the right to marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) and Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 US. 374, 383 (1978). In
Rochin, the officer's cO,nduct violated Rochin's right to be free from unwanted and unwarranted intrusions into the privacy of his body. See Rochin, 342 US. at 172-174.
152 See Rochin, 342 US. at 173. Because due process of law is a historic and generative principle, it "precludes defining, and thereby confining, these standards of
conduct more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend a "sense of justice." [d.
153 See id. at 173-174. The Court concluded that the proceedings by which
Rochin's conviction was obtained did "more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combating crime too energetically." [d. at 172.
The Court found that the officer's conduct shocks the conscience. [d. The officer's
course of conduct which consisted of "illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner [Rochin], the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, [and] the
146

147
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IV. NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS
In LaJoie v. Thompson,154 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether suppressing evidence of the victim's past sexual
abuse, for failure to give the required 15-day notice of intent
to introduce such evidence,155 violated LaJoie's Constitutional
rights.156 The court noted that Fourteenth Amendment and
Sixth Amendment constitutional jurisprudence guarantees
criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense. 157 It evaluated LaJoie's appeal of the district·
court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas COrpUS 158 in
light of clearly established Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
and determined that exclusion of the evidence violated LaJoie's Sixth Amendment compulsory process and confrontation
forcible extraction of his stomach's contents . . . to obtain evidence is bound to offend
even hardened sensibilities." See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. The Court described the officer's methods as "too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation." [d.
154 217 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2000).
165 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. LaJoie noticed his intent to present
evidence of VN's past history of sexual abuse by other only 7 days in advance of trial,
8 days late under Rule 412's notice requirement. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 674, Moreover, because LaJoie's attorney learned of the evidence well in advance of the notice
deadline, LaJoie did not meet the exceptions to the notice requirement under Rule
412(4)(a)(3). [d.
156 See id. at 667. LaJoie claimed that the trial court's exclusion of evidence of
the victim's past history of sexual abuse by others under Rule 412, violated his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. [d. LaJoie further claimed that exclusion of
the evidence violated his Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process and Confrontation
Clause rights. [d. A criminal defendant is guaranteed, under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment Confrontation and Compulsory
Process clauses, to put before the jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt and to have a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. See
supra notes 23-4 and accompanying text.
157 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668 (citing Crane, 476 U.S. at 690). See also supra
Parts III.B.2-III.BA.
158 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667. The Ninth Circuit noted that it reviews questions
of law such as a district court's decision to grant or deny a §2254 habeas petition de
novo. See id. at 667-668. Under the de novo standard of review, the court considers
the issues before it anew. See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990).
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the determination of what is "clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," under
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), as a question of law which must be decided de novo. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667 (citing Canales v. Roe, 151 F.3d 1226, 1228-1229 (9th Cir.
1998)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(I).
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clause rights. 159 Accordingly, the court's'majority opinion held
that the district court erred in denying LaJoie's petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. 160 Judge Ferguson authored a dissenting opinion. 161

A.

CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS, CONFRONTATION AND
COMPULSORY PROCESS RIGHTS

The Ninth Circuit emphasized that criminal defendants'
right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense is the same whether it is rooted in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory
Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment. 162
The Ninth Circuit then discussed the constitutional rationale underlying the Compulsory Process and Confrontation
clauses of the Sixth Amendment. 163 The court found that the
Compulsory Process Clause mandates that criminal defendants have the right to the government's assistance in compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial as well as
the right to put before a jury evidence that might influence
the determination of guilt. 164 Furthermore, the court reasoned
that the ends of criminal justice are not served if judgments
are not founded on a full presentation of the facts. 165 The
court further recognized that the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment ensures a criminal defendant the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses testifying against him.166
See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673.
See id. See supra also note 29 and accompanying text.
161 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673.
162 See id. at 668 (citing Crane, 476 U.S. at 690). See also supra note 145 and accompanying text.
163 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668.
164 See id. The Ninth Circuit looked to the Court's decision in. Ritchie, 480 U.S.
at 56, to determine the minimum rights guaranteed by the Compulsory Process
Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668. See also supra Part
III.B.3.
165 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668. The Ninth Circuit quoted Taylor, 484 U.S. at 411,
in which the Supreme Court articulated that the "ends of criminal justice would be
defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of
the facts." See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668. See also Taylor, 484 U.S. at 411; supra Part
III.B.2.
166 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668. The Ninth Circuit looked to the Court's decision
in Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678-679, in articulating criminal defendants' constitu159

160
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The Ninth Circuit stated that restrictions placed on a
criminal defendant's right to present a complete defense, to
put before the jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt, and to confront witnesses may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to
serve. 167 The court noted that a criminal defendant's failure to
comply with a rape shield law's notice requirement might in
some cases justify the severe sanction of preclusion of the evidence. 16S However, it emphasized that whether a rape shield
law's notice requirement justifies the severe sanction of preclusion must be determined by the courts on a case-by-case
basis by balancing the relevance of the evidence with the interests served by the notice requirement. 169
The Ninth Circuit scrutinized the Oregon Supreme
tional right to cross-examine witnesses testifying against him. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at
668. See also supra Part III.B.3.
167 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668. The Ninth Circuit relied on the Court's decision
in Lucas, 500 U.S. at 146, 149-153, for the controlling constitutional Supreme Court
precedent to determine whether the trial court unconstitutionally excluded the evidence under Rule 412, Oregon's rape shield statute, for failure to meet Rule 412's 15day notice requirement. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668. See also supra notes 84-85 and
accompanying text.
168 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 668-669. See also Lucas, 500 U.S. at 153. The Court in
Lucas noted that this rule does not mean that all notice requirements pass constitutional muster. See Lucas, 500 U.S. at 151. Only notice requirements that are arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve will not pass constitutional muster. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. The Court upheld a
Florida rule that required a criminal defendant to notify the State in advance of trial
of any alibi witness that he intended to call. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 84
(1970). The Court stated that the notice requirement in no way affected the defendant's decision to call alibi witnesses, rather, the rule only compelled the defendant to
accelerate the timing~ of his disclosure. Id. at 85. The Court emphasized that accelerating the disclosure of the evidence did not violate a defendant's constitutional rights
because "a criminal trial is not a poker game in which players enjoy an absolute right
always to conceal their cards until played." Id. at 82. Similarly, in Wardius v. Oregon,
412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973), the Court described notice requirements as "a salutary development that, by increasing the evidence available to both parties, enhances the
fairness of the adversary system." See Wardius, 412 U.S. at 474.
169 See LaJoie, 217 U.S. at 669. The Ninth Circuit cited other Circuit Courts and
state court decisions that demonstrate that Lucas requires case-by-case balancing. Id.
(citing Wood, 957 F.2d at 1551-1554; Agard, 117 F.3d at 703; Stephens v. Miller, 13
F.3d 998, 1001 (7th Cir. 1994); State v. Cuni, 159 N.J. 584, 733 A.2d 414, 422 (1999);
State v. Johnson, 123 N.M. 640, 944 P.2d 869, 876-878 (1997); People v. Lucas, 193
Mich. App. 298, 484 N.W. 2d 685, 687 (1992».
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Court's application of the Lucas test. 170 It held that the Oregon Supreme Court misapplied the Lucas test by finding that
the trial court's preclusion of the evidence did not violate LaJoie's Sixth Amendment Confrontation and Compulsory Process rights. l7l The court determined that although the Oregon
Supreme Court utilized the correct rule from Lucas,172 the Oregon Supreme Court misapplied that rule to LaJoie's case. 173
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Oregon
Supreme Court erred in its determination about whether the
purposes of Oregon's rape shield law and its notice requirement justified preclusion as a sanction for non-compliance
with the notice provision. 174 The court stated that had the Oregon Supreme Court properly applied the Lucas balancing
test, that court only could have reasonably reached one conclusion: that the preclusion of the evidence of VN's past sexual abuse by others was extreme and violated LaJoie's Sixth
Amendment rightS. 175
170 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 670. The Lucas test provides that restrictions on a
criminal defendant's right to confront witnesses and to present relevant evidence may
not be "arbitrary or disproportionate" to the purposes they are designed to serve. See
Lucas, 500 U.S. at 151.
171 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 670. The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's exclusion of evidence of VN's past sexual abuse by others. See LaJoie, 849 P.2d
at 490. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
172 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 670. The Court held in Lucas that preclusion of evidence for violation of notice requirements of rape shield laws does not violate the
Sixth Amendment if such a sanction is neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the
purposes of the notice requirement. See Lucas, 500 U.S. at 151.
173 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 670. The Ninth Circuit stated that the Oregon Supreme Court articulated that Rule 412's notice requirement was designed to prevent
surprise to the prosecution and the alleged victim, avoid undue trial delay, and protect the alleged victim from needless anxiety concerning the scope of the evidence to
be produced at trial. [d. See also LaJoie, 849 P.2d at 489. The Ninth Circuit also
found that the Oregon Supreme Court improperly concluded that the notice requirement was not arbitrary or disproportionate with respect to these intended purposes
because the Oregon Supreme Court never considered or balanced the interests in LaJoie's particular case. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 670. Rather, the Ninth Circuit found
that the Oregon Supreme Court determined that the balancing of the rights of defendants generally with the legitimate purposes of the notice requirement was inherent in the rule itself. [d. This, the Ninth Circuit held, constituted improper application of clearly established federal law as required by the Lucas test. [d.
174 See id.
175 See id. at 671. The Ninth Circuit found that the Oregon Supreme Court's conclusion was not objectively reasonable because of the highly probative value of the ev-
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In balancing LaJoie's interests in presenting the evidence
against the interests served by Rule 412's notice requirement,
the Ninth Circuit found that none of the interests justifying
the notice requirement of Rule 412 would have been abridged
had LaJoie been allowed to use the evidence. 176 The court determined that the probative value of the evidence in LaJoie's
case disproportionately outweighed the purposes of Rule 412's
notice requirement, and that the evidence would not be unduly prejudicial,177 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded
idence that LaJoie sought to introduce under Rule 412. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 671.
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the trial judge that the evidence that Watkins had been convicted of raping VN was relevant to provide an alternative explanation of the medical evidence offered by the State regarding injuries to VN's hymen,
which invited the inference that LaJoie must have caused those injuries. [d. The
Ninth Circuit further found that· LaJoie could have presented evidence of the other
sexual abuse to offer an alternative explanation for VN's hymenal injuries. [d. The
Ninth Circuit also found that evidence about Watkin's conviction for raping VN was
relevant to show an alternative source for VN's knowledge about sexual acts and
male genitalia, other than through rape by LaJoie. [d. The Ninth Circuit concluded
that had the evidence been admitted, the jury could have drawn the conclusion from
this evidence that VN had obtained her sexual knowledge from her abuse by Watkins. [d. at 672.
176 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 672. The Ninth Circuit evaluated the three interests
served by Rule 412's notice requirement, which the Oregon Supreme Court relied
upon in its analysis. See id. See supra notes 75, 76 and accompanying text.
177 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 672. The court may exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. FED. R. EVID. 403. The
Ninth Circuit held that the purposes of allowing time for the evidence to be carefully
screened and avoiding undue trial delay would not have been affected by admission
of the evidence in LaJoie's case because the trial court was able to screen the evidence within the time available and was able to decide which portions of the file were
relevant. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 672. The prosecutor had arguments prepared two
days after LaJoie filed his notice of intent to present the evidence for the hearing on
why the evidence should be excluded. [d. Therefore, the Court's consideration of the
prejudicial quality of the evidence would not have resulted in undue trial delay. [d.
The Ninth Circuit also stated that the interest in preventing unfair surprise was not
implicated in LaJoie's case because the prosecutor had just finished trying the rape
case of Watkins and was fully familiar with all the details of VN's CSD case file and
with all the details of VN's past sexual abuse. [d. The Ninth Circuit also found it persuasive that there existed no evidence that LaJoie's failure to give the 15 days' notice
was willful or strategic, rather than neglectful. [d. The Ninth Circuit further recognized that although a State's interest in the protection of minor victims of sex crime
from further trauma and embarrassment is a compelling one, in LaJoie's case this interest was outweighed by the high probative value of the excluded evidence. See La-
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that the trial court violated LaJoie's Sixth Amendment rights
since preclusion of the evidence was arbitrary and disproportionate to the purposes behind the 15-day notice
requirement. 17s

B.

HABEAS CORPUS

Once the Ninth Circuit decided that the Oregon Supreme
Court violated LaJoie's Sixth Amendment rights, the court
looked at whether the error warranted habeas corpus relief.179
The court applied the "unreasonable application" test. ISO The
court looked at whether the Oregon Supreme Court's decision
that upheld the trial court's preclusion of the evidence,
amounted to an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States. lSI In a federal habeas proceeding, the court
Joie, 217 F.3d at 672. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit determined that the excluded
evidence had little potential for being unduly prejudicial to the VN, the alleged victim, because the evidence concerned non-consensual sexual abuse of a young child,
therefore, the jury would be unlikely to draw an unfavorable and unwarranted impression of the alleged victim, VN. [d. at 673.
178 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673. See also supra note 76 and accompanying text.
179 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673. The Ninth Circuit focused on whether the district
court erred in denying LaJoie's petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on the district court's conclusion that the Oregon Supreme Court's decision was not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States. [d. The Court of Appeals reviews de novo a district
court's decision to grant or deny a habeas petition. See Eslaminia v. White, 136 F.3d
1234, 1236 (9th Cir. 1998). A federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus is the
relevant state-court decision was either: (1) contrary to clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. See Taylor, 529 U.S. at 428; AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(l). A state court's decision can be contrary to federal law either, 1) if it fails
to apply the correct controlling authority, or 2) if it applies the controlling authority
to a case involving facts "materially indistinguishable" from those in the controlling
case but nonetheless reaches a different result. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 428-429. A
state court's decision can involve an unreasonable application of federal law if it either: 1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts
in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.
[d. See also supra Parts III.A.1-III.A.3.
180 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673; Williams, 529 U.S. at 429. See also supra Part
III.A.2; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
181 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673.
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must also determine whether the State court's error had a
substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's
verdict. 182
The Ninth Circuit concluded that even had the Oregon
Supreme Court properly applied the Lucas test to the circumstances in LaJoie's case, the Oregon Supreme Court's decision
amounted· to an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law as espoused by the Supreme Court of the
United States. 183 The court further held that the exclusion of
the evidence seriously damaged LaJoie's defense because the
jury heard only that part of the story that implicated LaJoie
and not the highly probative evidence of the past sexual
abuse that VN had experienced. 184 Accordingly, the court held
that the district court erred in holding that the Oregon Supreme Court's decision was a reasonable application of clearly
established United States Supreme Court precedent, and
182 See id. The Ninth Circuit looked to United States Supreme Court authority to
determine the standard for whether habeas relief must be granted in a federal
habeas proceeding: whether the court's error had "substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict." See id. (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623).
183 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673. The clearly established federal law applied by the
Ninth Circuit and the Oregon Supreme Court to LaJoie's case was the Lucas test:
preclusion of evidence for violation of notice requirements of rape shield laws does
not violate the Sixth Amendment if such a sanction is neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to the purposes of the notice requirement. [d. See also Lucas, 500 U.S. at
151. Clearly established federal law requires that courts undertake case-by-case balancing of the defendant's rights against those of the State and the victim under the
Lucas test. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 669. See also supra note 84 and accompanying
text. The Ninth Circuit did not consider whether the Oregon Supreme Court's application of the Lucas test was contrary to clearly established federal law because they
concluded that it was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 669 n.13.
184 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673. The Ninth Circuit agreed with LaJoie's contention that the jury convicted him without the benefit of the evidence of the past sexual
abuse that the jury could have determined was exculpatory because, in several ways,
it tended to make it less likely that LaJoie had raped and sexually abused VN. [d.
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that exclusion of the evidence by the trial
court had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict. [d. The excluded evidence which the jury could have found exculpatory was that: (1) Russell Watkins,
one of VN's mother's boyfriends, had been convicted of raping VN which was relevant
to rebut or explain the State's evidence of VN's hymenal injuries and to provide an
alternate source of VN's ability to explain sexual acts; and (2) certain evidence was
relevant to show the alleged motive or bias of VN because it tended to show that
VN's allegations were false and were invited by CSD caseworkers. [d. at 666. See also
supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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therefore, erred in denying LaJoie's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. 185

c.

DISSENTING OPINION

Judge Ferguson dissented, stating that the majority made
several fundamental errors. 18G First, he opined that the majority incorrectly determined that the evidence, which LaJoie
sought to put before the jury, constituted relevant evidence.187
Second, he believed that the majority incorrectly determined
that LaJoie's interests in introducing the evidence outweighed
those of the State in precluding it. 188 Third, he found that the
majority opinion improperly carved out an exception to a rape
shield statute's notice requirement whenever a defendant vicSee LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 674.
See id. Judge Ferguson began his dissent with a discussion of VN's history of
sexual abuse from the time she was two until the time she was in the second grade
and went to live with her aunt and LaJoie at his isolated farm. See id. The dissent
also described in detail the abuse that VN claimed she suffered at the hands of LaJoie almost every night. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 674.
187 See id. The dissenting opinion also discussed the evidence of five separate incidents of sexual abuse suffered by VN excluded by the trial court that LaJoie sought
to introduce as evidence. [d. These five incidents were: (1) a teenaged boy had pulled
down her pants once when she was five; (2) a man had sexually assaulted VN's
brother; (3) her brother had inserted a plastic knife into her anus when she was
three; (4) a relative had touched her genitals when she was about five; and (5) her
mother's boyfriend had raped VN once when she was about eight. [d. at 675. LaJoie
argued that this evidence would give the jury an alternative explanation for both the
condition of VN's hymen and what LaJoie deemed her sophisticated awareness of sexual terminology. [d.
188 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 674. Judge Ferguson described the trial court's determinations during the in camera hearing regarding the evidence that LaJoie sought to
introduce under Rule 412. [d. at 675. He discussed the trial court's reasons for excluding the evidence which were: (1) the evidence was irrelevant and confusing; and
(2) LaJoie had missed the deadline under Rule 412 and did not meet the exception
under Rule 412- because the evidence was known to the defense well in advance of
the notice deadline. [d. Specifically, the trial judge stated, "[llet's narrow it to [the
mother's boyfriendl. I don't think the other stuff is, first of all, relevant to this case,
specifically when we go back years beyond." See id. The trial judge further ruled that
even the evidence about the rape by VN's mother's boyfriend was too confusing to
come before the jury on the issue of VN's awareness of sexual terminology. [d. AB the
trial judge explained, "I find that the information, if relevant, is in this situation so
confusing as to the issue of crimes of Mr. LaJoie, as not to be admissible. 1 want to
steer away from these matters involving [the mother's boyfriendl." See LaJoie, 217
F.3d at 675.
185

186
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timizes a child. 189 Finally, he found that even if the majority
correctly determined that the state courts committed constitutional error by excluding the evidence, the majority incorrectly identified the error as one that warranted habeas
relief. 190
Judge Ferguson engaged in a two-part inquiry to determine the constitutionality of the exclusion of the evidence: (1)
whether the evidence was relevant and (2) whether the
State's interest in excluding the evidence outweighed LaJoie's
interests in presenting it.191 He analyzed the same issue addressed in the majority opinion, whether exclusion of the evidence LaJoie sought to put before the jury violated his Sixth
Amendment Confrontation and Compulsory Process Clause
rights. 192

1. Lack of Relevant Evidence
Judge Ferguson's dissent asserted that the majority improperly held that the evidence, which LaJoie sought to intro189

See id.

190 See id. at 674. Judge Ferguson found that despite the trial court's ruling to
exclude the evidence, LaJoie essentially received what he wanted because the jury
learned at several points during the trial that others had sexually assaulted VN. [d.
at 675. The information received by the jury included: (1) a stipulation describing the
abuse VN suffered at both the hands of her relative and the teenaged boy; (2) that
VN had participated in group therapy for sexually abused children for several
months and that LaJoie had nothing to do with that referral; (3) a CSD counselor
testified that VN "said that her Uncle Clint was the first person who had done what
she called a bad touch," this testimony revealed that others had molested VN; and (4)
VN's aunt testified that she had spoken to two police officers about reports of abuse
that did not relate to LaJoie at all. [d. Judge Ferguson stated that the jury did in
fact learn that VN had an extensive history of sexual abuse by others but it nevertheless rejected LaJoie's defense of innocence and found him guilty of rape, sodomy,
and sexual abuse all in the first degree. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 675-676.
191 See id. at 676 (citing Wood, 957 F.2d at 1549-1550. In Wood, the Ninth Circuit
found that if the evidence is not relevant then the defendant has no right to present
it. See Wood, 957 F.2d at 1550. If the evidence is relevant, the court must inquire
whether other legitimate interests outweigh the defendant's interests in presenting
the evidence. [d. In Wood, the Ninth Circuit held that evidence of that the victim
modeled in Penthouse and acted in pornographic movies was not relevant as to
whether she consented to a sexual relationship with the defendant, therefore, the evidence was properly excluded. [d.
192 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 676.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol31/iss1/4

38

Dykman: Rape Shield Statutes

2001]

RAPE SHIELD STATUTES

39

duce, was relevant. 193 LaJoie contended at trial that evidence
of VN's history of sexual abuse was relevant to provide an alternative explanation for what he deemed VN's unusual
knowledge of sexual terminology.194 However, Judge Ferguson
argued that VN was ten years old at the time of trial and her
testimony displayed an awareness of sexual terminology consistent with her age. 195
Judge Ferguson also noted that the Ninth Circuit rejected
this same argument on indistinguishable facts in United
States u. Torres. 196 In Torres, the defendant, who was convicted of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, argued on appeal
that the trial court violated his confrontation rights when it
refused to permit him to provide an alternative explanation
for what he deemed was his nine-year old victim's sophisticated knowledge of sexual terminology.197 The Ninth Circuit
refused to reverse the trial court, noting that the victim's testimony did not demonstrate any unusual knowledge of sexual
techniques or nomenclature, therefore any evidence that
would provide an alternative explanation was irrelevant. 198
Judge Fergurson analogized VN's testimony to the young victim's testimony in Torres because it did not demonstrate that
VN had an advanced knowledge of sexual terminology.199 AcSee id.
See id. Judge Ferguson observed that VN did not display a sophisticated
knowledge of sexual terminology that triggered a constitutional right to present an
alternative explanation for its source. [d. He pointed to the record which shows that
only when the prosecutor handed VN an anatomically correct doll was she able to
say, "he tried to make it fit but it just wouldn't fit." [d. However, soon after that VN
reverted to telling the jurors that she couldn't verbalize the crimes LaJoie had committed. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 676.
195 See id. Notably, Judge Ferguson described VN's testimony in which she used
words like "bad touch," "rub," "my private," with "his private," "fingers," "tongue,"
"sore," and "hurt." [d. Moreover, when the prosecution prodded VN with questions
about where LaJoie had put his "private," she initially responded that she couldn't
remember and then stated that she could not put into words what LaJoie had done
to her. [d.
196 See id. See also United States v. Torres, 937 F.2d 1469, 1470 (9th Cir. 1991).
197 See Torres, 937 F.2d at 1471-1472, 1474. In Torres the nine-year old victim's
testimony was similar to VN's testimony in the LaJoie because like VN's testimony it
was replete with simple references to "private spot," "private parts," and "private
places." [d. at 1474.
198 See id.
199 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 677.
193

194
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cordingly, Judge Ferguson concluded that LaJoie's argument
that VN's testimony demonstrated an advanced knowledge of
sexual terminology lacks merit, just as it did in Torres. 200 On
this basis, Judge Ferguson concluded that evidence of VN's
history of sexual abuse should have been deemed irrelevant
and inadmissible. 201
Similarly, Judge Ferguson contended that the evidence,
which LaJoie attempted to introduce to provide an alternative
explanation for VN's medical condition, was not relevant for
this purpose. 202 He noted that the prosecutor sought to prove
that LaJoie had caused VN's repetitive sexual injuries and
none of the evidence offered by LaJoie could have provided an
alternative explanation to the State's medical evidence because it was not indicative of repetitive sexual injuries. 203 Although the State's medical expert testified upon crossexamination that he could not rule out the Watkins' rape of
VN as the cause of her injuries, Judge Ferguson contended
that the majority took this testimony out of context. 204
See id. Judge Ferguson disputed the majority's attempt to distinguish the
facts of Torres from LaJoie's case. See id. Although the majority stated that Torres
was different from LaJoie's case because in 1brres the excluded evidence did not involve penetration, whereas LaJoie's proffered evidence did, Judge Ferguson maintained that in Torres the Ninth Circuit did not consider the nature of the evidence at
all. See id. Rather, the Ninth Circuit in Torres only dealt with the preliminary question of whether the victim displayed an uncommon knowledge of sexual terminology,
and finding that the victim did not, determining the relevance of the evidence was
unnecessary. [d. Judge Ferguson insisted that the Ninth Circuit did not need to even
consider the nature of the evidence in LaJoie's case because VN, like the victim in.
1brres, had· knowledge of sexual terminology that fit her age. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at
200

677.

See id. See also supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 677. Judge Ferguson argued that the prosecution
sought to convince jurors that VN's medical condition was consistent with repetitive
sexual injuries. [d. Furthermore, the evidence that LaJoie offered did not match VN's
medical condition because most of it did not involve penetration and could not have
caused VN any sexual injury. [d. at 678. Judge Ferguson conceded that the rape of
VN by Watkins did involve penetration, however, he contended that one rape could
not have explained the repetitive injury. [d.
203 See id.
204 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 667 nA, 677. Judge Ferguson argued that the expert's
testimony, considered in context, shows that he responded in this way because he
had not reviewed VN's file and he could not remember the details of VN's history of
abuse and therefore could not rule out Watkins' role in causing her injuries. [d. at
201

202

677.
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Notably, Judge Ferguson found that LaJoie's case fell
squarely under a previous Ninth Circuit case where the state
convicted the defendant of carnal knowledge of a female less
than sixteen years of age. 205 In Payne, the court rejected
Payne's argument that the exclusion of this evidence violated
the Sixth Amendment because the court determined that the
evidence was more prejudicial than probative. 206 Judge Ferguson reasoned that the Ninth Circuit's holding in Payne stands
for the proposition that if the proffered evidence (in LaJoie's
case, a one time sexual injury; in Payne heavy petting) does
not provide an alternative explanation for a medical condition
(in LaJoie's case, repetitive sexual injury; in Payne, multiple
episodes of sexual intercourse), the trial court does not violate
the defendant's constitutional rights in refusing to admit the
evidence. 207 Thus, Judge Ferguson concluded that the evidence
offered by LaJoie at trial was irrelevant. 208
205 See United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1461 (9th Cir. 1991). The trial
court refused to allow Payne to present evidence that the victim had engaged in
heavy petting in a trailer with someone else. [d. "at 1468. Similar to LaJoie's case, an
expert testified, at the trial in Payne, that the condition of the twelve-year-old victim's vagina was consistent with multiple episodes of sexual injury. [d. at 1470.
206 See id. at 1469-1470. In Payne, the Ninth Circuit explained that at trial, the
defendant offered no expert testimony in support of his argument that possible digital penetration during the petting incident could explain the condition of the victim's
hymen and vagina. [d. at 1469. Therefore, the incident had minimal, if any, probative value as rebuttal to the State's medical evidence, and excluding it did not violate
Payne's confrontation rights. See Payne, 944 F.2d at 1470. Judge Ferguson asserted
that other circuits have also held that where the evidence the defendant offers does
not alternatively explain the State's medical evidence, it is not error to exclude such
evidence. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 678-679. See, e.g., Jones v. Goodwin, 982 F.2d 464,
469-470 (11th Cir. 1993) (held that petitioner did not have a constitutional right to
introduce evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct when the State did not rely on
evidence of virginity); United States v. Eagle Thunder, 893 F.2d 950, 954 (8th Cir.
1990) (held that trial court did not err when it refused to admit evidence of a nonrecent hymenal tear because it could not provide alternative explanation for a recent
one).
207 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 679. Judge Ferguson further concluded that the. proffered evidence was irrelevant as to the question of VN's credibility because the jury
had sufficient information to determine VN's credibility. [d. LaJoie professed his innocence when he took the stand, two teachers testified for the defense that VN was not
honest and LaJoie was able to vigorously cross-examine VN regarding her motives in
reporting him for rape. [d.
208 See id. He concluded that the evidence was irrelevant because, (1) it would
not provide an alternative explanation for VN's knowledge of sexual vocabulary because her vocabulary was normal for her age, (2) it would not give jurors an alterna-
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2. The Oregon Supreme Court Properly Applied the Lucas Test
Judge Ferguson believed that the majority incorrectly
concluded that the Oregon Supreme Court failed to fulfill its
constitutional duty under Michigan v. Lucas. 209 He noted specific references in the Oregon Supreme Court's opinion that
demonstrate that the Oregon Supreme Court properly considered the facts in LaJoie's case to determine whether the exclusion of the evidence violated LaJoie's Sixth Amendment
rights. 210 Accordingly, Judge Ferguson reasoned that the Oregon Supreme Court fulfilled its duty under Lucas by considering the specific facts in LaJoie's case. 2l1

3. Proper Exclusion of the Evidence
Judge Ferguson also maintained that the Oregon Supreme Court properly upheld the trial court's exclusion of the .
evidence.212 After balancing the interests of the State, the victim, and LaJoie, he concluded that exclusion of the evidence
of VN's past history of sexual abuse did not violate LaJoie's
tive explanation for her medical condition, and (3) it was inadmissible to attack VN's
credibility. [d. at 679. Although the dissent asserts that the inquiry should end with
the determination that the proffered evidence was irrelevant, the dissent nonetheless
analyzes whether the State's interests in excluding it outweighed LaJoie's interests in
presenting it. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 679-680.
209 See id. at 680. The Ninth Circuit, in line with other circuits, has held that
Lucas requires case-by-case balancing by the court of the particular facts in the petitioner's case to determine whether restrictions on a criminal defendant's rights are
arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes the restrictions are designed to serve.
See supra note 169 and accompanying text. Contrary to the mE\iority's assertions,
Judge Ferguson's opinion asserted that the Oregon Supreme Court did not analyze
LaJoie's case in the abstract. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 680.
210 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 680. The specific parts of the Oregon Supreme Court
opinion noted by the dissent in which that court discussed the particular facts in LaJoie's case are: (1) "under the specific facts presented here, we hold that such a failure [to comply with the statute's notice provision) does . . . require [preclusion) and
that the requirement is constitutional"; and (2) "[w)e next consider the subconstitutional question whether OEC 412 required preclusion as a mandatory sanction under the facts of this case." [d.
211 See id. at 680. Judge Ferguson reasoned that the mE\iority's finding that the
Oregon Supreme Court failed to address the facts in LaJoie's case, pursuant to its
duty under Lucas, could not be squared with the language in the Oregon Supreme
Court's opinion. [d.
212 See id.
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constitutional rights. 213 Judge Ferguson contended that the
State had valid reasons for excluding the evidence and its interests in doing so substantially outweighed LaJoie's interests
in admitting the evidence. 214 He noted that the 15-day notice
period serves several compelling interests and that the Oregon rape shield statute constituted a valid legislative determination that child rape victims deserve heightened protection
against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of
privacy. 215
See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 680.
See id. Judge Ferguson took strong exception to the majority's broad assertion
that "because the alleged victim was a ten-year old at the time of trial . . . the interest of the victim in eight extra days of repose is far outweighed by the probativeness of the excluded evidence." Id. at 680-681. Judge Ferguson declared that this
broad statement about ten-year old children creates an "unprincipled exception to the
notice requirement whenever defendants have victimized children. Id. Notably, Judge
Ferguson stated that the majority failed to cite any authority for this general proposition about children and their interests in repose. Id. To the contrary, Judge Ferguson
pointed to United States Supreme Court authority, also acknowledged by the majority, that the well being of child abuse victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in some cases, a defendant's right to face his accusers in court. See
LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 680-681 (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1982». See
also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-757 (1982) (held that it is evident that a
State's interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor
is compelling).
215 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 680-681. The compelling interests enumerated by
Judge Ferguson were: (1) permitting children to stop worrying about whether they
will be forced to describe experiences of sexual abuse; (2) protecting the child from
the additional emotional trauma of having to prepare to recount details of sexual
abuse so close to trial; (3) offering the child's guardian the opportunity to seek professional help to assist in coping with the added trauma of having to describe painful
events in the courtroom; and (4) giving the State an opportunity to discuss with the
victim the truthfulness of the evidence the defendant seeks to put before the jury. Id.
For further examples of the interests served by the rape shield statute's notice requirement, the dissent cites authority from other circuits. Id. In Tague v. Richards
the Seventh Circuit explained that "elimination of the risk of embarrassment furthers the state's interests in encouraging children to report cases of molestation so
that perpetrators can be prosecuted." Id. at 681 (citing Tague v. Richards, 3 F.3d
1133, 1139 (7th Cir. 1993». Similarly, in Richmond v. Embry the Tenth Circuit recognized that "allowing the defense to inquire as to the condoms and the male visitor
would not only have subjected the [12 year old] victim to embarrassment and humiliation, but could have had the effect of deterring future victims from reporting sexual
assaults." See Richmond v. Embry, 122 F.3d 866, 874 (10th Cir. 1997). Judge Ferguson
noted that the Lucas Court specifically explained that Michigan's notice and hearing
requirement in its rape shield statute "represents a valid legislative determination
that rape victims deserve heightened protection against surprise, harassment, and
213
214
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In addition, Judge Ferguson stated that LaJoie's failure to
comply with the 15-day notice requirement, even though he
was aware of this evidence well. in advance of the notice deadline, must be considered in weighing all the relevant interests. 216 Because LaJoie did not fulfill the 15-day notice requirement, Judge Ferguson concluded that the State and VN's
interests in excluding the evidence outweighed LaJoie's interests. 217 Therefore, Judge Ferguson would have affirmed the
Oregon Supreme Court. 218

4. Any Error Did Not Sufficiently Prejudice LaJoie to Grant
Habeas Relief
Judge Ferguson stated that even if the lower court committed constitutional error by excluding the evidence offered
by LaJoie, the error was not so prejudicial to warrant a writ
of habeas corpus. 219 He also asserted that the evidence against
LaJoie was overwhelming. 220 He observed that all of the testiunnecessary invasions of privacy." See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 681. See also Lucas, 500
U.S. at 149·150.
216 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 682. See generally Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37,
53 (1996). The Court has recognized the principle that "the introduction of relevant
evidence can be limited by the State for a 'valid' reason . . . " See Egelhoff, 518 U.S.
at 53.
217 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 682·683. Judge Ferguson stated that the State's interests consist of protecting the child victim from revealing her tragic history, encouraging victims to report abuse, and ensuring that defendants like LaJoie comply with
notice provisions when they know well in advance of trial the evidence they seek to
introduce. [d. On the other hand, LaJoie's only interest was placing before the jury
evidence that Judge Ferguson regarded as minimally relevant, if at all, and confusing. [d.
218 See id. Judge Ferguson found that the Oregon Supreme Court reasonably upheld the trial court's exclusion of the evidence of VN's past history of sexual abuse offered by LaJoie and this exclusion did not violate LaJoie's constitutional rights. [d.
219 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 682. See also supra Part III.A.3. Applying the "substantial and injurious effect or influence" standard articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Brecht v. Abrahamson, Judge Ferguson concluded that if the court
committed constitutional error, the error did not warrant habeas relief. See LaJoie,
217 F.3d at 682. See also Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. The majority applied the same
standard. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 682. Judge Ferguson contended that the majority
erroneously concluded that the error committed by the trial court required habeas
corpus relief. [d.
220 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 682. The evidence adduced at trial which Judge Ferguson regarded as overwhelming was: (1) VN's testimony that LaJoie molested and
raped her almost everyday; (2) the testimony of three Children Services Division
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mony at trial supported the expert's medical evidence indicating that VN had suffered repetitive sexual injuries. 221 Accordingly, he concluded that in light of the minimal probative
value of the excluded evidence, and the fact that the jury
learned at several points about VN's extensive history of sexual abuse by others, the exclusion of the evidence did not
have a substantial and injurious effect or influence on LaJoie's defense. 222 As a result, Judge Ferguson would not have
granted LaJoie a writ of habeas corpus. 223
V. CRITIQUE

In LaJoie v. Thompson,224 the Ninth Circuit improperly
granted habeas relief because the trial court's exclusion of evidence of VN's past history of sexual abuse by others did not
substantially undermine LaJoie's defense. 225 The United
States Supreme Court in Michigan v. Lucas offered no definitive guidance for balancing the State's and the victim's interests against the defendant's constitutional interests under
rape shield laws. 226 Even in the absence of such guidance, the
prejudicial effect of the evidence, which LaJoie sought to introduce at trial, substantially outweighed its probative
counselors about VN's consistent out-of-court statements; (3) the testimony of a police
officer and a doctor that VN offered them substantially similar descriptions of LaJoie's crimes against her; and (4) the testimony of a teacher of VN during the time
she lived with LaJoie that VN frequently complained that it "hurt down there." [d.
221 See id.
222 See id. at 683. Judge Ferguson argued that had the trial court permitted LaJoie to introduce the evidence of VN's history of sexual abuse, the jurors would have
learned that three people assaulted her but never penetrated her and about the rape
by Watkins that cmild only account for one sexual injury, not the repetitive sexual injuries demonstrated by the medical evidence. [d. Moreover, Judge Ferguson reasserted that the majority failed to address the. fact that the jury learned at several
points during the trial about VN's extensive history of sexual abuse by others. See
LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 683.
223 See id.
224 217 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2000).
225 See id. at 673.
226 See Lucas, 500 U.S. at 153. The Court reman~ed the case for the Michigan
courts to address whether on the· facts of Lucas' case preclusion violated his rights
under the Sixth Amendment. [d. The Court expressed no opinion as to whether preclusion was justified in Lucas because the only issue before the Court was the per se
rule adopted by the Michigan Court of Appeals that preclusion was unconstitutional
in all cases where the victim had a prior sexual relationship with the defendant. [d.
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value. 227
A. IMPROPER APPLICATION OF THE MICHIGAN V LUCAS TEST

Several Ninth Circuit decisions demonstrate that the
Ninth Circuit's failure to find that the prejudicial effect of the
evidence offered by LaJoie substantially outweighed its probative value is inconsistent with Ninth Circuit precedent.228 For
example, in Wood v. Alaska,229 the Ninth Circuit held that evidence that the victim showed the defendant nude photographs
of herself from men's magazines and that she discussed her
pornographic acting experiences with him was more prejudicial than probative and was therefore inadmissible in a rape
triaJ.230 Although the Ninth Circuit determined that the evidence excluded in Wood was relevant, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the prejudicial effect of the evidence greatly outweighed its probative value because Wood presented direct
evidence that he had a sexual relationship with the victim. 231
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit found it highly probable
that the jury would improperly consider this evidence and
draw conclusions that the victim was an immoral woman or
that a woman with her sexual past could not be raped. 232 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial court
properly excluded the evidence because the potential prejudiSee LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673.
See Wood, 957 F.2d at 1544; Payne, 944 F.2d at 1458. The Ninth Circuit applied the Lucas balancing test in accordance with United States Supreme Court and
Ninth Circuit precedent, however, the Ninth Circuit should not have granted LaJoie
habeas relief because the exclusion of the evidence did not substantially undermine
his defense. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 673. Although the constitutionality of the application of a rape shield statute is determined on a case-by-case basis in accordance
with Ninth Circuit precedent, the Ninth Circuit's finding in LaJoie cannot be squared
with Wood and Payne. See discussion infra Part Y.A.
229 See 957 F.2d 1544, 1546 (9th Cir. 1992). See also supra notes 137-138 and accompanying text.
230 See id. at 1554.
231 See id. at 1553. The Ninth Circuit found that the evidence was relevant to
whether the victim had a previous sexual relationship with the defendant Id. The
Ninth Circuit noted that the defendant himself testified that he previously had sex
with the victim and he presented witnesses who testified that he and the victim were
affectionate, that they went into the defendant's bedroom often and once they came
out of the bedroom partially undressed. Id. See also text accompanying note 66.
232 See Wood, 957 F.2d at·1552-1553.
227

228
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cial effect substantially outweighed its slight probative
value. 233
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Payne,234
held that evidence of the young victim's prior involvement in
a "heavy petting" incident with another person was more prejudicial than probative on the issue of medical evidence of injury to the victim's hymen. 235 The Ninth Circuit noted that
the defendant failed to establish any likelihood that the victim's alleged prior sexual activity could provide an alternative
explanation for the medical evidence. 236 Although the defendant asserted that digital penetration of the victim possibly occurred during the "heavy petting" incident and that this penetration could explain the condition of the victim's hymen, the
defendant offered no expert testimony in support of this argument. 237 Again, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial
court appropriately excluded the evidence because the incident had minimal, if any probative value, which was outweighed by the potential prejudicial effect to the young
victim. 238
In light of Ninth Circuit precedent, the Ninth Circuit in
LaJoie erred in concluding that the probative value of the evidence of VN's past history of sexual abuse by others out233 See id. at 1553-1554. The Ninth Circuit stated that this evidence would be
more probative in cases where the excluded evidence would establish the bias of a
crucial prosecution witness and thereby might undermine the witness' credibility and
the strength of the state's entire case. [d. at 1554. Ai; an exemplar of this type of situation, the Ninth Circuit noted the United States Supreme Court's holding in Olden
u. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232-233 (1988), where the Court found a Sixth Amendment
violation when the trial court excluded evidence of the rape victim's relationship with
another man because the rape victim was a crucial prosecution witness and the evidence would have explained why she had a motive to lie. See Wood, 957 F.2d at 1554.
234 944 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1991).
235 See id. at 1469. The victim in Payne was the 12-year old foster daughter of
the defendant. [d. at 1462.
236 See id. at 1469.
237 See id. The victim's examining physician at trial testified that the condition of
the victim's vagina was consistent with multiple episodes of sexual intercourse. See
Payne, 944 F.2d at 1470. The examining physician also testified that digital manipulation could tear the hymen but it wouldn't be expected to change the size of the vaginal canal. [d. Furthermore, the defense expert did not testify that digital manipulation could account for the medical evidence presented by the State. [d.
238 See id.
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weighed the danger of unfair prejudice. 239 The court maintained that because the prosecution relied on medical
evidence of injuries to VN's hymen, and thereby invited the
inference that LaJoie must have caused those injuries, evidence that her mother's boyfriend had raped VN became probative. 240 However, the court did not declare that the other incidents of sexual abuse included in the excluded evidence are
probative on the issue of the medical condition of VN's
hymen.241
The Ninth Circuit's conclusion in LaJoie, that the evidence of other acts of sexual abuse in VN's past was more
probative than prejudicial, is questionable. Those acts of sexual abuse simply did not offer an alternative explanation for
the presence of VN's injuries stemming from the repetitive
sexual abuse by LaJoie. 242 Moreover, evidence of the one incident of rape cannot be characterized as highly probative because it similarly did not offer an alternative explanation for
the medical evidence, which pointed to repetitive sexual
abuse. 243 In addition VN did not display a sophisticated
knowledge of sexual terminology that triggered a constitutional right to present an alternative explanation for its
source. 244 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit should not have characterized the evidence of VN's past history of sexual abuse as
highly probative on the issue of VN's knowledge of sexual terminology.245 Considering the low probative value of the excluded evidence, the Ninth Circuit should not have concluded
that the jury would remain unlikely to draw an unfavorable
and unwarranted impression of the young victim simply because the evidence in this case concerned non-consensual sexual abuse of a young child.
See Wood, 957 F.2d at 1544; Payne, 944 F.2d at 1458.
See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 671. The majority reasoned that rape is a crime that
requires proof of penetration. [d.
241 See id. See also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
242 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 678. See also supra note 12 and accompanying text.
The only act of abuse documented in VN's CSD case file, which involved penetration,
was the rape of VN by her mother's boyfriend. See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 678. See also
supra note 202 and accompanying text.
243 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 678.
244 See id. at 676-679. See also supra Part IV.C.
246 See LaJoie, 217 F.3d at 676-679.
239

240
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B.

EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED THE EVIDENCE, No SUBSTANTIAL AND INJURIOUS EFFECT OR INFLUENCE
RESULTED TO GRANT HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF

The Ninth's Circuit should not have concluded that a 10year old child is less entitled to the extra eight days of repose. 246 This conclusion stands in stark contrast to the Ninth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Payne, which held that
evidence of the young victim's alleged involvement in a heavy
petting incident with a person other than the defendant had
low probative value and that the prejudicial effect of an obviously embarrassing situation outweighed the low probative
value. 247 Even if VN was young at the time of trial, the Ninth
Circuit ignored its own precedent by failing to acknowledge
the highly. prejudicial effect that introduction of the evidence
could have ori VN.248 Judge Ferguson, who dissented, properly
concluded that the majority's broad generalizations about
young victims of sexual crimes created an exception to the
rape shield statute's notice requirement whenever a defendant
victimizes a young child. 249 As a young child, VN did not become less entitled to the protections provided by rape shield
statutes from undue embarrassment and harassment. To the
contrary, these protections were of great importance to VN
because evidence of the prior incidents of sexual abuse in
VN's past could have possibly caused the jury to improperly
conclude that VN was the type of child who somehow brought
this sexual abuse upon herself. 250 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
should have concluded that exclusion of the evidence did not
have a substantial and injurious effect on LaJoie's defense
and did not warrant habeas relief.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit's decision in LaJoie demonstrates the
difficulty courts have in balancing the interests of the state,
the victims and the Constitutional interests of a criminal
See id. at 672-673. LaJoie filed his notice eight days late under Oregon Rule
412's 15-day notice requirement. See id. at 665.
247 See Payne, 944 F.2d at 1469.
248 See supra Part V.A.
249 See supra notes 177, 214 and accompanying text.
250 See Payne, 944 F.2d at 1469; Wood, 957 F.2d at 1544.
246
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defendant under rape shield laws. Although the Ninth Circuit
properly utilized the Lucas balancing test to determine
whether the trial court's exclusion of the evidence violated LaJoie's constitutional rights, it improperly concluded that LaJoie's interests in presenting that evidence to the jury substantially outweighed the young victim's interests in
excluding it.251
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit should not have granted
LaJoie habeas relief since the trial court did not commit constitutional error by excluding evidence. Even if the trial court
violated LaJoie's due process and Sixth Amendment confrontation and compulsory process rights, this error did not have
a substantial and injurious effect or influence on LaJoie's defense. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit improperly determined
that young victims of sex crimes have less interest in remaining free from the undue harassment and embarrassment that
rape shield statutes serve to prevent. 252 As a result, the Ninth
Circuit improperly carved out an exception to a rape shield
statute's notice requirement when the victim so happens to be
a young child. The United States Supreme Court should not
develop rigid guidelines to aid the circuit courts in applying
the Lucas balancing test because the unique circumstances of
every case would not permit this. Rather, to aid the circuit
courts, especially in sexual assault cases involving children,
the Court should entitle young victims to the same protection
under rape shield statutes as adults. All young victims are
entitled to this protection regardless of their age or ability to
understand the court proceedings because all young victims
are entitled to be shielded from any further unnecessary
trauma.

Crystal Dykman *

251 See Lucas, 500 U.S. at 151-153. See also supra Part III.B.l.b., note 177 and
accompanying text.
252 See supra notes 177, 214 and accompanying text.
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